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HOW THE RICH STAY RICH: 
USING A FAMILY TRUST COMPANY TO SECURE A FAMILY FORTUNE  
 
Iris J. Goodwin* 
 
 
 
He started a story that began, "The very rich are different from you and me." Someone 
said, "Yes, they have more money." 
 
- Ernest Hemingway, The Snows of Kilimanjaro 
 
We’re not a family… we’re a firm! 
 
- King George VI about the British Royal Family1  
 
This Article is about family trust companies and the way they are used 
by very wealthy families to preserve great fortunes.  A family trust 
company is a corporation formed to provide fiduciary services to a 
single family or related group of people, in contrast to banking 
institutions established to offer similar services to a larger public.  The 
province of the mega-rich (who remain very much upon the American 
landscape, the recent economic crisis notwithstanding2), the family 
trust company is generally thought to be a vehicle for families with a 
net worth of at least $200 million.3  While the family trust company has 
long been important in securing the fortunes of some of the nation’s 
wealthiest families, scant attention has been paid to it by the academic 
bar.  This Article aims to redress this longstanding oversight, especially 
in light of recent changes in the law that make these entities far more 
accessible to the very wealthy.   
 
Family trust companies are not new in the U.S., but first appeared in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the wake of the 
Gilded Age, when a few of the nation’s wealthiest families created 
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1
 SIMON HALL, THE HUTCHESON ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BRITISH HISTORY 147 (Paul Davis ed., 
Taylor and Francis 1999). 
2
 While the recent economic crisis has been consequential for the very rich (as for everyone else) and many 
great fortunes currently reflect the decline in the market, many of the America’s wealthiest families remain 
among the nation’s – and the world’s -- most financially fortunate people. “The rich haven’t gotten richer – 
or poorer – this year.”  See Forbes 400, http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/16/richest-american-billionaires-
lists-400list08-cx_mm_dg_0917richintro.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).   
3
 Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS, May-
June, 2008 at 44..  
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them.4  The family trust companies of this earlier era were usually 
organized under the same laws and regulatory requirements that would 
govern any state-chartered trust company serving the public.  Recently, 
however, following upon the economic boom of the last twenty-five 
years (what some have dubbed America’s “Second Gilded Age”5), the 
law in some states has become much more accommodating, making 
these entities far easier to create and to operate – much more accessible 
to wealthy families looking to preserve their fortunes far into the 
future.6  But to appreciate the significance of the family trust company, 
we must not only attend to the particulars of recent laws that so 
effectively facilitate establishment of these entities.  We must also 
examine this entity in situ, as the very wealthy employ it, as the 
masterstroke in a series of aggressive planning techniques – tax-driven 
and otherwise -- that potentially secure and indeed grow a fortune for 
untold generations to come.     
 
Great fortunes tend to dissipate for a number of reasons.  The most 
obvious source of pressure (or so it would seem) emanates from the 
federal wealth transfer tax regime -- of which the estate tax is the 
principle tax.  This tax was enacted for the precise purpose of ensuring 
the exhaustion of great fortunes within a few generations.7  Be this as it 
may, however, the estate tax is now and has been from its inception a 
voluntary tax – at least for the very rich.8  While the transfer tax regime 
has continued to evolve and indeed over time has become more 
exacting in its demands, in every era the very rich and those that advise 
them in the intergenerational transfer of assets have responded with 
                                                 
4
 Some of these are still around and now, in addition to serving multiple generations of the founding family, 
they have opened their doors to the public.  See, e.g., RICHARD R. DAVIS, THE PHIPPS FAMILY AND THE 
BESSEMER COMPANIES 76 (Turner Publishing Company 2007). 
5
 Ronald D. Aucutt, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennessee College of Law). 
6
 Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate 
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 690-91 available at SP020 
ALI-ABA 675. 
7
  See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 22 (23d ed. West 
Group 2006) 
8
 James Casner, noting the extraordinary effectiveness of generation-skipping transfers in circumventing 
the transfer tax regime, remarked to the House Ways and Means Committee, “[i]n fact, we haven’t got an 
estate tax, what we have, you pay an estate tax if you want to; it you don’t want to, you don’t have to.” 
Estate and Gift Taxes: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means,  94th Cong. 2d Sess. Pt 2, 1335 (Mar. 
15-23, 1976) (statement of Professor A. James Casner). See also Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax? 
Revisited USC Olin Research Paper No. 01-5 at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269352; George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New 
Perspectives on  Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161(1977).  This point obtains, 
notwithstanding recent populist lamentations about the “death taxes.”  Thus, while there is no doubt that the 
advent of the Obama administration and the Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress has restored 
the infamous tax to the political terra firma,8 for the super-wealthy this sea-change in Washington makes 
for little moment. Jonathan Weisman, Obama Plans to Keep Estate Tax Democrats Want to Freeze Levy at 
Current Levels  WALL STREET JOURNAL, January 12, 2009 at A1. The privately-owned, family-operated, 
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ever more complex techniques to minimize the burden of this tax.  
Whatever the era, however, such strategies must be employed unless 
the tax is to exert its dissipating force.  Our era is no different and, in 
fact, can be distinguished only by the sophistication of the more 
popular strategies and the magnitude of their ambition – and by their 
frequent reliance upon the privately-owned, family-operated, family 
trust company as their crowning implement.   
 
But in our era, not only does the family trust company play a role in 
various tax-planning strategies that minimize the pressure of the federal 
fisc, but these entities are also established as a bulwark against other 
important but less obvious sources of pressure on great wealth.  The 
very wealthy and their advisers have long been aware that other 
powerful, dissipative forces are in play with respect to great fortunes.  
Indeed, these forces are so significant that in the face of them the 
benefits of sophisticated tax planning can be reduced to naught in short 
order.  In these other battlegrounds in securing the wealthy in their 
privilege, attention has come to center on what happens to great 
fortunes after they have been transferred into trust (often done as part 
of a strategy to shelter wealth from the transfer tax regime).  The 
transfer of wealth into trusts benefiting successive generations of the 
family (with the location of control outside the family9) has in and of 
itself augured a diminution in fortunes over time. There is an old joke 
among trust beneficiaries:  “How do you make a small fortune?  Give a 
bank a large one to manage in trust!”10   
 
The super-wealthy of today, particularly those who earned their 
fortunes in the economic boom of the last twenty years, believe that 
important among the reasons that great fortunes dissipate is that large 
banking institutions manage money too conservatively, especially 
money in trust.11  Whatever the era, the fundamental reason that a 
super-rich family forms a family trust company is the desire to invest 
its own wealth, even after (for reasons of transfer tax planning) it has 
been transferred into trust.12 This was the case in earlier times,13 but it 
is especially so today. These families are now prepared to make their 
own determination of risk, even if their wealth is in trust, bringing an 
                                                 
9
 There are many legal reasons to name a third-party as trustee.  For example, naming the donor of the trust 
is trustee limits the discretion the trustee can be granted unless the transfer is to run afoul of a number of 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code applicable to transfers in trust that will cause inclusion of the trust 
in the donor’s estate.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) (2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.2036 (2007). 
10
 Jesse Dukeminier & James F. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2003) 
1335. 
11
 See, Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium 
Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at  68.   
12
 Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS, 
May-June, 2008 at 43-44.  
13
 See, e.g., RICHARD R. DAVIS, THE PHIPPS FAMILY AND THE BESSEMER COMPANIES 59-60 (Turner 
Publishing Company 2007). 
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entrepreneurial mindset to bear on their funds.  The same mindset that 
they believe was essential to the creation of their fortunes is the 
mindset they believe can maintain those fortunes.14  The problem has 
been getting into the driver’s seat and it is here that the family trust 
company appeals. 
 
Until about twenty years ago, the law of fiduciary duty would not have 
readily encompassed an entrepreneurial mindset with respect to 
investing funds in trust, whoever was in the driver’s seat.  If banking 
institutions managed money conservatively, this posture was consonant 
with the law.15  About twenty years ago, however, the law governing 
the investment of trust assets began to change and it is this change in 
the law that wealthy families intend to exploit to the fullest once their 
wealth is in trust and the family trust company is at the helm.16  In our 
era, determination of the risk profile appropriate to any portfolio has 
become (consistent with the law) as much an art as a science and is 
ultimately governed by the totality of facts and circumstances 
surrounding the account.  This means that, if the account is large 
enough and the horizon long enough, even highly speculative 
investments such as venture capital and private equity can become 
appropriate investments for property in trust.17   
 
But size does matter.  Even under the new standard of care, an 
aggressive investment strategy must be justified, and a very large 
corpus in a long-term trust can justify taking a greater degree of risk in 
investing the account.  Here is the point where the advanced planning 
techniques permitting a wealthy family to transfer tens of millions of 
dollars into trust with little to no transfer tax liability (either at the 
creation of the trust when property is transferred or later as assets still 
in trust serve successive generations of the family) become truly 
important.  The family trust company is then established not simply to 
implement various tax-planning strategies or to secure their benefits, 
but to exploit those benefits to justify an aggressive investment posture 
consonant with the law.  Without the drain upon family funds (and the 
dissipating pressure) that the transfer tax burden would otherwise 
constitute, much of the family fortune can be transferred into trust in 
tact, justifying an aggressive investment strategy once the funds are 
held there.  Then, with a sufficiently entrepreneurial spirit at the helm, 
the new standard of care makes it possible to do with property in trust 
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 Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS, 
May-June, 2008 at 43-44. 
15
 See infra,  
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 See, infra,  
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 See infra,  
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what has rarely been done before18 -- and potentially great fortunes do 
not merely cease to wane, but can actually appreciate.   
 
Whatever control of investing a family may garner by establishing a 
family trust company, however, this control will be useless if the family 
cannot muster from generation to generation from within its ranks the 
financial acumen and expertise and indeed the discipline to make state-
of-the-art investment decisions.  Interestingly, as part of the effort to 
end what some advisors have termed “financial entropy” within 
wealthy families, there has emerged a literature offering guidance in 
“financial parenting” so that wealthy children come of age free of the 
self-indulgence and accompanying desuetude that is said to commonly 
characterize the lives of second- and third-generation members of such 
families.19  Such character flaws (so this literature claims) ensure that, 
strategies to minimize the toll of the transfer tax regime 
notwithstanding, great fortunes are soon lost, lending truth to the 
proverb “shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations.”20  According 
to this literature, the antidote lies in the cultivation across generations 
of attitudes about money, investing and risk, with the intent of fostering 
an awareness not only of the magnitude of their privilege but also its 
financial underpinnings.21   
 
And here again, in this “financial parenting,” the family trust company 
enters to play an instrumental role.  If the operation of a family trust 
company requires certain skills and attitudes, the trust company itself 
(so this literature observes) can serve as a forum in which education in 
these skills and attitudes can take place.  Senior executives (the older 
generation) can school junior executives (the younger generation) in the 
course of making investment decisions.  But further, within the 
framework of the family trust company, families are encouraged to 
recruit outside experts, from financial sages to psychologists, to hold 
seminars for family members about wealth -- even about “feelings” 
                                                 
18
 See, e.g., RICHARD R. DAVIS, THE PHIPPS FAMILY AND THE BESSEMER COMPANIES 81-104 (Turner 
Publishing Company 2007). 
19See JESSIE O’NEILL, THE GOLDEN GHETTO:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AFFLUENCE (Affluenza Project 1997).  
Ms. O’Neil was the granddaughter of the former president of GM.  Drawing upon her own experience, she 
developed the term “affluenza” as a summary reference to the flaws often developed by children of the very 
wealthy.  See also, Linda C. McClain, Family Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the Family, 75 
FORDHAM  L. REV. 833, 861 (2006); Pierce H. McDowell III, Family Owned Private Trust Companies, 
ABA TRUSTS AND INVESTMENTS, May-June, 2008 at 43-44. 
20
 JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH -- KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY:  HOW FAMILY MEMBERS AND 
THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 3 (rev. ed. 
Bloomberg Press 2004) 
21
 JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH -- KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY:  HOW FAMILY MEMBERS AND 
THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 116-18 
(rev. ed. Bloomburg Press 2004). 
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about being wealthy – all with the object of thwarting financial 
entropy.22   
 
Finally, the family trust company and its applications in the 
perpetuation of great fortunes bear normative implications that any 
treatment of this entity should not overlook.  It has long been a 
commonplace of democratic theory that, while democracy is largely 
immune to some degree of material difference within a polity, 
intransigent, radical differences in means are problematic.23  For this 
reason, the dissipation of great fortunes has been viewed as salubrious 
in a democratic polity.24  “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three (or so) 
generations” is more than a proverb; it is an operating condition of a 
healthy democracy.25   
 
For many theorists of democracy, the virtually tax-free transmission of 
wealth from generation to generation within wealthy families has not 
been deemed politically or socially consequential, however, because 
there has been a failsafe:  fortunes are quite precarious, whatever their 
size, as they dissipate in the ordinary course (even if they escape tax as 
they move between generations).26  If great fortunes do indeed dissipate 
in the ordinary course, then, where democracy is concerned, the 
effectively voluntary nature of the estate tax is seemingly less 
consequential – provided that fortunes do in fact dissipate.  If the 
family trust company succeeds where advisers claim it can, however, 
the financial entropy that has been thought to inhere in great fortunes – 
and to be at least a background condition of a thriving democracy -- 
will be a thing of the past. 
 
In this regard it is worth returning to uses of the family trust company 
in financial “financial parenting” to make one additional preliminary 
observation.  As wealthy families are encouraged to gather within the 
family trust company in order to embrace their privilege self-
consciously, thereby to eliminate the precarious nature of their fortune, 
                                                 
22
 JAMES E. HUGHES, JR., FAMILY WEALTH -- KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY:  HOW FAMILY MEMBERS AND 
THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL AND FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 116-18 
(rev. ed. Bloomburg Press 2004). 
23
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 44  (Liberty Fund ed., George W. Carey & James McClellan eds. 2001). 
24
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971).  Rawls defends inheritance taxes “not to raise 
revenue….but gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations 
of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.“  
25
 See, e.g., Alexis De Tocqueville, Introduction to Volume One and Part 3 Section 3 “Social State of the 
Anglo-Americans” in ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, pp. 50 (Anchor Books, 1969) 
(1835).  See also B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue? in 1 TAX POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 113, 121-32 (Lawrence J. Summers ed. 1987); Michael J. Boskin, An Economist’s Perspective 
on Estate Taxation. in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY:  ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 
at 65 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed. 1977); and Gary Solon, Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United 
States 82 AM. ECON. REV. 393-398, 403-05 (1992). 
26
 Michael J. Boskin, An Economist’s Perspective on Estate Taxation. in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY 
PROPERTY:  ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 65-66 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed. 1977). 
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they potentially secure themselves in a world apart – precisely what the 
wealth transfer tax was meant to preclude.27  The sustained process of 
gathering together within the family trust company for the purpose of 
preserving and growing wealth encourages these families to discern and 
indeed embrace the special circumstances – and privileges -- of great 
wealth, for the precise purpose of securing them into the future.  The 
family trust company is designed to be privilege-sustaining, indeed 
privilege-enhancing.   
 
One last point:  In the wake of the recent economic turmoil, we might 
think that anyone with an entrepreneurial mindset would feel 
chastened, particularly given that many speculators have suffered 
enormous losses and speculative excess is what – so many say -- has 
brought the U.S. economy to its knees. And the many of the wealthy 
have seen a decline in the value of their holdings like everyone else.  
Be this as it may, however, with pundits disagreeing about the 
effectiveness of various antidotes to the crisis and no one confidently 
auguring the light at the end of the tunnel, the time could not be riper 
for the wealthy to want to manage their own risk, to protect against 
further downside as well as to position portfolios to take advantage of 
early opportunities that will appear when the U.S. economy starts to 
recover.28  And this is no less the case where the property is held in 
trust.   
 
Part I of this Article examines those recent changes in the laws in some 
states that allow for ease of set up and operation of a trust company 
serving a related group of people.  This Part sets the stage for 
appreciating the role that these entities potentially play in forestalling 
the erosion of great fortunes. 
 
Part II recognizes that size matters in justifying fiduciary investment 
decisions and provides an overview of the valuation alchemy 
commonly brought to bear on great fortunes as they are being 
transferred into perpetual trusts.  Among other strategies, we consider 
the “Note-Sale,” a strategy commonly employed to transfer enormous 
wealth into trust with virtually no transfer tax liability.  If size matters 
in justifying investment decisions under the Prudent Investor standard, 
then these strategies for transferring wealth with little to no tax 
consequence are crucial to empowering the trustee to invest some 
portion of the trust corpus aggressively.     
 
                                                 
27
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971).   
28
 Indeed, for many very wealthy people this economic crisis represents an opportunity of sorts.  With asset 
values reduced, assets may be transferred within the family at substantially reduced value transfer tax costs.  
See, Deborah L. Jacobs, As Economy Declines, Donors Rethink Estate Planning, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2008  at F 27. 
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Part III treats the Prudent Investor statute and the opportunity it has 
created under the law to grow assets in trust if other circumstances are 
congenial and an entrepreneurial mindset is at the helm in the capacity 
of fiduciary.   
 
Part IV explores the use of the family trust company as a platform by 
which to cultivate within the family financial expertise and attitudes 
concerning money calculated to end financial entropy and secure a 
family in its privilege for generations to come.     
 
I.  The Modern Family Trust Company 
 
Continuing to invest the family fortune after it has been transferred into 
trust has long held significant appeal for wealthy families and, for well 
over a century, family trust companies have been used as a means to 
that end.  Family trust companies first appeared in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  Then they were organized as state-
chartered and state-regulated banks under the same laws and regulatory 
requirements that would govern any state-chartered trust company 
serving the public.29  In our era, a family trust company can still be 
organized this way,30 but recent changes in the law (at least in some 
states) make this unnecessary.   
 
a.  The new regulatory regimes.  While a wealthy family can still create 
a national bank (regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency) or a state bank (regulated by state banking authorities), it is 
now possible to create an unregulated or a “lightly regulated” trust 
company, if the entity is limited in its purpose to serving as trustee of 
trusts31 benefiting a group of related people.32  In one group of states, 
                                                 
29
 In fact, a number of these earlier family trust companies have grown into banking institutions that serve a 
larger public.  Created to serve the family of Henry Phipps, Bessemer Trust opened its doors to the public 
in 1972.  See Bessemer Trust, https://www.bessemer.com/portal/site/bessemernew/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2009).  Pitcairn Family Office was established to manage the fortune of the descendants of John Pitcairn, 
co-founder of what is now PPG Industries.  The firm opened its doors to other wealthy families in 1987, 
providing (among other financial services) fiduciary services. See Pitcairn Family Office, 
http://www.pitcairn.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).  Rockefeller Trust was established 125 years ago by 
John D. Rockefeller to manage money for his descendants.  See Rockefeller, http://www.rockco.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2009). 
30
 The entity is unlikely to be organized as a national bank or a state bank, unless the family plans to open a 
business effectively and to take deposits and offer other conventional banking services.  See Carol 
Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner 
Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 
675. 
31
 Family trust companies also serve as executors of the estates of family members.  See Carol Harrington 
& Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to 
Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675.  
32
 Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate 
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020 
ALI-ABA 675.  Interestingly, states do not always specify what is meant by the requirement of a “related 
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legislatures have responded with new and separate private trust 
company charters, so that trust companies serving only a related group 
of people can be subject to “lighter” requirements than those imposed 
on trust companies serving the general public.33   In certain other states, 
liberalization of the law has occurred by simply allowing a limited 
purpose corporation to act as a trust company under the general statutes 
of the state.34  Some states make available both options – light 
regulation or no regulation.35  Whichever scheme a family elects, these 
innovations at the state level have reduced the costs of formation and 
operation for these new entities.   
 
(i) The “lightly regulated” family trust company.  The “lightly 
regulated” family trust company is still chartered by the state and 
subject to state supervision, although not on a level comparable to a 
bank or trust company serving the general public, provided the 
organizing documents limit the purpose of the entity to the provision of 
fiduciary services to members of a family or a group of related people 
and, further, prohibit the trust company from soliciting business from 
the public at large.36  Even a so-called “lightly” regulated family trust 
company will usually have to have a minimum number of directors37 
(and perhaps with one or more directors resident in the state), a 
minimum number of board meetings per year38, a physical office in the 
state39, and a minimum number of employees.40  Further, there must be 
                                                                                                                                                 
group of people.”  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-1 (2007).  But see NEV. REV. STAT. § 
669.02(1)(b) (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392:40-a(I)(a) (2006). 
33
 States permitting a “lightly regulated” family trust company include Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 
773, 774, 779 (2001), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a, 392.40-b (2006)); South 
Dakota and Alaska.  
34
 States permitting an unregulated family trust company include Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-32.1 
(1999)). 
35
 States allowing both include Massachusetts, Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 669.080(1)(o)).and Wyoming.        
36
 With respect to family trust companies, especially where unregulated but even where lightly regulated at 
the state level, some advisors have been concerned that these entities could be subject to registration with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  Because these 
entities offer trustee services (and with this investment advice), some advisors have worried that they were 
potentially subject to the 1940 Act.  And in that they are not regulated by state banking regulators to any 
meaningful degree, they would not qualify under the “bank” exemption there.  This would mean that, while 
changes in state law would exempt these entities from one form of regulation (state banking regulation), by 
exempting them from this regulation they would be subjected to another regulation (1940 Act).  See. e.g., 
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate 
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 694 available at SP020 
ALI-ABA 675.  In 2007, upon the representation that the family trust company organized as a limited 
liability company under Wyoming law did not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser, the 
SEC issued an order of exemption under Section 202(a)(11)(F) of the Advisers Act.  See Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2599, March 20, 2007.  
37
 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 661.135 (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392:40-a(II), 384:3(IV) 
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-13 (2007). 
38
 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 661.165 (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a(II), 384:7 
(2006) S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-15 (2007). 
39
 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 660.015(1) (YEAR); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-58 (2007).  
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in place a formalized risk-management discipline, which will be 
periodically reviewed by state regulators.  This discipline can include 
bylaws, a policy manual (setting forth, among other things, a committee 
structure and decision rules for those committees), annual reports41, and 
appropriate record-keeping42.  Capital requirements vary state by state 
but are universally modest (with some states as low as $200,00043 and 
others up to $2 million44).  Some states imposing lighter capital 
requirements (e.g., South Dakota and New Hampshire) also require a 
surety bond of $1 million.45 
 
(ii) The unregulated trust company.  Some states offer an even more 
liberal regime, however.  In these states a state-issued charter is not 
required to establish a family trust company nor will be the state 
exercise subsequent regulatory oversight.46  States that allow family 
trust companies to form without any regulation typically permit the 
family to create a limited purpose corporation that then acts as a trust 
company under the general statutes of the state.  The organizing 
documents (as was the case with the lightly regulated regime) must 
limit the purpose of the entity to the provision of fiduciary services to 
members of a family and, further, prohibit the trust company from 
soliciting business from the public at large.  For entities organized 
under these regimes, there are usually no capital requirements.  The 
simpler procedures for organization, the absence of periodic 
examinations, and the absence of capital requirements allow a family 
trust company to be quickly and easily established and make it less 
expensive to operate.47   
 
b. Organizing the Family Trust Company:  Type of Association and 
Where Located?   Creation of a family trust company begins with a 
determination as to the type of business association and the governing 
structure of this entity.  The family must also decide the state in which 
the family trust company will be organized and operated.  These 
decisions are crucial if the family is to realize the potential of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
40
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 51A-6A-31 to -32 (2007). For example, in South Dakota, the requisite minimum 
number of employees is one and state examinations occur only every eighteen months.  See also NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 669.110, 665.135(2) (YEAR).  
41
 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 669.080(1)(o), 669.110, 665.105 (YEAR); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.40-b 
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-34 (2007).   
42
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-30 (2007). 
43
 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 779, 745 (2001). 
44
 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.40-a(II), 392.25(I) (YEAR); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-19 (2007). 
45
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A-19 (2007). See also Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust 
Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING 
EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 709 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675. 
46
 E.g., Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wyoming. The Virginia statute only authorizes 
an unregulated private trust company. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-32.1 (1999). 
47
 Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate 
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 690-91 available at SP020 
ALI-ABA 675. 
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family trust company, first as a significant component within an 
advanced tax planning strategy and later as a vehicle by which to 
secure the family fortune into the future.   
 
(i) Organization and Governance.  A variety of considerations can drive 
this decision as to the type of business entity to be used.  Since states 
that have liberalized their laws with respect to the formation of family 
trust companies usually permit these to be organized as limited liability 
companies, most families will organize as a limited liability company, 
although some still form a corporation.48  To take advantage of those 
state statutes that have recently liberalized the regulatory framework 
applicable to family trust companies, the entity is typically organized 
for the limited purpose of providing trust services to a particular family 
or group of related individuals.49   
 
Once a decision is made with respect to the type of business association 
to be used, the family must put in place a governance structure so that 
the family can, through the various administrative arms of the trust 
company, effectively control the investment of trust funds (among 
other things) .50  The ownership interest is usually vested in individual 
family members.51  Family members also serve on the board of 
directors.  The board can also include outside advisors of 
longstanding.52  To the extent that the applicable state statute requires 
that one or more directors be resident in the state where the trust 
company has been created and where it will operate, local attorneys and 
other advisers can be named.  In all events, however, states that permit 
                                                 
48
 A partnership would not be used because the entity would terminate when one of the partners died.  This 
would defeat one of the purposes of creating an entity to serve as trustee rather than relying upon an 
individual. 
49
 Ronald D. Aucutt, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennessee College of Law). 
50
 While control of investing the trust corpus rarely has adverse tax consequences for the family, control of 
distributions of income or principal by family members to family members can have disastrous transfer tax 
consequences.  Because the desire to control of distributions is usually not the primary reason that a family 
establishes a family trust company, decision-making within the family trust company can usually be 
structured so that adverse tax consequences.  See I.R.S. Notice 2008-31 I.R.B. 261.  
51
 Trusts established for the benefit of family members can also hold some or all of the ownership interest 
in a family trust company – a further step that, among other things, removes the ownership interest from 
family members’ estates.  Indeed, it is not uncommon for the trusts for which the family trust company is 
the trustee to own the family trust company.  This circularity may appear to present questions with respect 
to fiduciary duty and enforceability, as this structure renders the beneficiaries themselves, though their 
beneficial interests in the trust, economically identical to the trustee.  While there are elements of irony 
here, however, in truth the situation is not fundamentally different from the situation where individual 
family members are the trustees of trusts benefiting the family.  See Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, 
Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA 
CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 694 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675.; Ronald D. Aucutt, 
The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennsee College of Law). 
52
 Ronald D. Aucutt, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family Offices (March 8 & 9, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Iris Goodwin of the University of Tennsee College of Law). 
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a family to create a lightly-regulated or unregulated family trust 
company also permit the family to control the board, the necessary 
presence of others notwithstanding.     
 
ii.  Caveat:  Liability.  For the family that objects to bureaucratic red-
tape, the unregulated family trust company has appeal, at least at first 
glance.  Ease of formation and operation notwithstanding, however, a 
reason for creating a family trust company is to overcome one of the 
drawbacks in naming an individual as trustee – that is, the personal 
liability of the trustee.  If the trustee is organized as a corporation or a 
limited liability company, then the trustee’s liability should be limited 
to the amount of any required formation capital and the value of any 
surety bond.  So, for example, in South Dakota where capital in the 
amount of $200,000 is required for formation along with a $1 million 
surety bond, liability would be limited to $1.2 million.  This is the case, 
however, unless the corporate veil is pierced.  If this occurs, then those 
members of the family deemed the principals are potentially liable.53  
Thus, even a family that dislikes red-tape may decide that some degree 
of regulation and such organizational niceties as bylaws, a policy 
manual, a committee structure with formalized decision-making 
processes, and good record-keeping lend a crucial element to the entity, 
that is, organizational integrity.54     
 
iii.  Trust Company State Situs.  Because not every state allows a 
family to establish a modern family trust company, obviously the entity 
must be organized and operated in a state where the law has been 
liberalized, unless, of course, the entity is to be organized under one of 
the legal regimes governing those trust companies serving the public.55  
The state in which the trust company is organized and operated is 
important for other reasons as well, however.  The situs of the trust 
company will also supply the situs and governing law for any trusts 
established by the family where the trust company is named as 
                                                 
53
 Of course, the beneficiaries suing for breach of trust will be the children, siblings, cousins, nieces and 
nephews of those serving in a decision-making capacity in the trust.  Suffice it to note that this can happen. 
54
 DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST 
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS:  WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, OCTOBER 17-18 (2007); 
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate 
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 693 available at SP020 
ALI-ABA 675. 
55
 In fact, a number of these earlier family trust companies have grown into banking institutions that serve a 
larger public.  Created to serve the family of Henry Phipps, Bessemer Trust opened its doors to the public 
in 1972.  See Bessemer Trust, https://www.bessemer.com/portal/site/bessemernew/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2009).  Pitcairn Family Office was established to manage the fortune of the descendants of John Pitcairn, 
co-founder of what is now PPG Industries.  The firm opened its doors to other wealthy families in 1987, 
providing (among other financial services) fiduciary services. See Pitcairn Family Office, 
http://www.pitcairn.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).  Rockefeller Trust was established 125 years ago by 
John D. Rockefeller to manage money for his descendants.  See Rockefeller, http://www.rockco.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2009). 
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trustee.56   If the family trust company is to be the masterstroke in a 
sophisticated estate plan, it is also crucial that it be located in a state 
where the law is optimal for the realization of all aspects of the plan.  
Fortunately, for the families undertaking these complex estate plans, 
many of the states that have liberalized their laws with respect to 
forming privately owned, family trust companies have also changed 
their laws governing the creation and administration of trusts to make 
them attractive to those looking to place significant wealth in trust with 
their own trust company as trustee.57   
 
d. Alternative Fiduciaries – “Big Banks” and Private Individuals.  
Families of extraordinary wealth would almost always58 be welcome 
clients of existing banks and trust companies – those that, for a fee, 
readily serve as fiduciary for members of the public.  Or, in the 
alternative, these families could avoid using a big bank by naming an 
individual as trustee, either a person expert in fiduciary matters (e.g., 
a lawyer specializing in trusts and estates) or someone without 
professional expertise, perhaps a family member.  Either of these 
choices would allow a family to avoid the burdens of establishing and 
then operating a trust company of its own.  Both a big bank trustee 
and an individual fiduciary have significant limitations for people 
with considerable wealth who want to provide for multiple 
generations of their families by transferring this property into long-
term trusts.   
 
(i) “Big Banks.”  Big banks now typically offer their wealthier clients 
state-of-the-art estate planning assistance, along with structures and 
services consonant with changes in the law particularly attractive to the 
very wealthy eager to transfer their property into trust.  For example, 
these institutions now commonly have subsidiaries in states that allow 
for the creation of perpetual trusts.  Further, consistent with the prudent 
investor statute, these institutions often offer a platform of cutting-edge 
investments appropriate to the risk-profile of large privately-held 
fortunes, even those in trust.   
 
                                                 
56
 The situs of the trust company will supply the situs for any trust for which the family trust company or 
some other trustee (banking institution or resident individual) in the state is the original trustee.    
57
 That is, trusts that name the family trust company as the initial trustee.  Trusts for which the family trust 
company is successor trustee are another question.  The family trust company cannot create nexus with 
respect to all important legal issues for a trust that names as initial trustee a person domiciled in another 
jurisdiction or another trust company located in another jurisdiction.   
58
 Certain banks and conventional trust companies are reluctant to accept in trust volatile or hard-to-manage 
assets such as real estate, operating companies, or a non-diversified portfolio consisting in an ownership 
interest in either a closely-held company or a publicly-traded one where the family does not want the 
portfolio diversified.  See Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family 
Offices: What Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 
689 available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675. 
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For families establishing privately owned, family trust companies, 
however, these available structures and services are not enough.  With 
respect to state situs, for example, not only is the possibility of 
establishing a perpetual trust at issue for these families, but there are 
other provisions of state law that can also be advantageous in 
establishing a trust.  One state may allow perpetual trusts, but another 
may allow these plus have a more attractive law with respect to asset 
protection.  Prudent Investor statutes also vary state by state.  In 
establishing a trust, these families want to elect the state situs that is 
optimal for them, not one determined by a large institution to be 
optimal for its client-base.    
 
And with respect to investments, notwithstanding any platform of 
sophisticated vehicles offered by existing banks and trust companies, 
these families want to continue to invest their property, even after it has 
been placed in trust.  Prudent investor notwithstanding, a trustee has a 
duty not only to invest but to conserve the assets of the trust in 
accordance with statutorily mandated fiduciary standards.  Any 
investment program subject to fiduciary standards is to look to the 
interests of income beneficiaries and remaindermen, both born and 
unborn.59  This is a tall order and a big-bank trustee is mindful that, for 
any risk profile established by a it, the standard of review looks to 
common fiduciary investment practice.60  This means that banks and 
trust companies serving the larger public are generally loathe to invest 
an account more aggressively than they anticipate their competitors 
would invest, given the risk profile.  Also, while trustees are not 
required to guarantee results as they invest a trust portfolio, the duty of 
care encourages these institutions to attend to deliberative processes 
carefully recorded, as a prudent process is usually a good defense to a 
bad result.   
 
There are opportunity costs, however, attendant upon convening 
committees and reaching decisions in accordance with procedural 
dictates and there are those that believe such tentativeness to be 
ultimately unproductive, especially where the account is of significant 
size and the time horizon is that of the perpetual trust.  Many families 
establishing privately owned, family trust companies want to be free of 
such constraints.  These families are seeking to ensure full exploitation 
of any prudent investor statute by developing their own, more nuanced 
risk-profile to govern investment decisions for their property placed in 
                                                 
59
 Suzanne M. Trimble, Lilfe’s Hard Choices”  Why Choose a Corporate Trustee?, 14-SEP CBA Rec. 44 
(2000). See also David S. Prince, Sutton’s Law and Economic Applied to the Professional Fiduciary:  
Helping the Trustees to avoid Predatory Litigants, 119 BANKING L.J. 17 (2002).   
60
 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 657 (1995). The 
standard of prudent investing has been the standard of industry practice – what other trustees similarly 
situated were doing. See also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent investor Act and the Future of Trust 
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644 (1996). 
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trust and want, where possible, to be free of bureaucratic red-tape so 
that they can turn on a dime in making investment decisions.61  In short, 
these families are seeking to exploit prudent investor to the max.  They 
want a trustee that is willing and able to facilitate the realization of 
goals consistent with their own risk-assessment.   
 
(ii) Alternatives – Individual Trustees.  Of course, these families could 
avoid using a big bank by naming an individual as trustee, either a 
person expert in fiduciary matters (e.g., a lawyer specializing in trusts 
and estates) or someone without professional expertise, perhaps a 
family member.  But to the extent that these families are seeking to 
establish their trusts in a state with statutes optimally advantageous for 
their particular purposes, an individual – expert or otherwise – cannot 
provide the nexus necessary to create situs unless he or she is domiciled 
in the desired state.62  Further, even if an appropriate individual can be 
located in the desired state, individuals go on vacation, become 
incapacitated, die and resign.63  This fact is usually of modest moment 
in a garden-variety trust, one of moderate size, established to last one or 
two lifetimes.  In the case of a perpetual trust holding a fortune in 
cutting-edge investments, however, such limitations can be 
consequential indeed.  If an individual trustee is contemplated, what 
will be needed (vacations notwithstanding) is an unbroken line of 
succession from one honest, experienced, informed and ideally astute 
individual to the next, each residing in the appropriate jurisdiction.  
And ultimately, this succession of individual fiduciaries must 
potentially serve with respect to multiple trusts, all with slightly 
different rationales.   
 
Further, given the complexity of the provisions in a typical perpetual 
trust and the challenges that inhere in investing a portfolio of great size, 
an individual trustee (even a person with professional expertise) must 
commonly resort to a bank or other financial services provider (or a 
collection of providers) to serve as agent for the trustee in any number 
of capacities.64  This does not mean that the individual trustee will 
delegate fiduciary responsibility as he or she always retains a duty to 
                                                 
61
 And to the extent a big bank might be willing to look beyond its own investment platform to 
accommodate a particular family’s investment interest, any investment direction would still be subject to 
the bank’s deliberative process – red-tape that these families want to avoid. 
62
 Certain objections to big banks can be overcome by naming an individual as co-trustee and assigning this 
person certain responsibilities, making the bank a “delegated” or “directed” trustee.  This alternative can 
have consequences of its own, however, as some states tax the income earned by trusts according to where 
the individual trustees reside. See DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE 
TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS:  WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD 
TRUSTEE, 22 2007. 
63
 Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, The Nuts and Bolts of Private Trust Companies and Family 
Offices, ACTEC Annual Meeting, March 8 & 9, 2008, Seminar G, SEMG-13-CAH. 
64
 DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST 
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS:  WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, 16-17 October, 2007.  
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monitor an agent’s performance.65  Nevertheless, when an individual 
trustee is named to serve alone, investment advice, custody and 
sometimes even record-keeping and tax return preparation are 
commonly contracted out to large corporate institutions.66   
 
Finally, trustees are personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty – 
something that is always of concern but is of particular moment here 
where the plan contemplates a relatively aggressive posture on the part 
of the fiduciary with respect to investments.  Many families in naming 
an individual as trustee will attempt to redress this vulnerability by 
including an indemnification provision in the trust instrument, 
especially since individual trustees often find insurance coverage 
limited or unavailable.67  Under current law, however, the legal force of 
such indemnifications is uncertain, with many commentators arguing 
that, to bind, these must be limited in the trust agreement to particular 
assets or specified situations.68  In addition, the intractable problem of 
personal liability here makes for yet another obstacle to finding 
individuals willing to serve as trustee, not only initially but 
successively.  In contrast, the liabilities of a family trust company (and 
of any employee serving there) are more easily managed.69 
 
A family trust company can avoid the perceived opportunity costs 
inherent in the use of a big bank as trustee as well as other limitations 
(including potential liability) attendant upon naming an individual.  The 
family trust company (itself a corporate entity) then becomes an 
attractive alternative, blending the structural advantages of a corporate 
trustee with the discretionary latitude of an individual one.70    
 
 
Part II:  Valuation Alchemy:  Creating the Trust Corpus 
 
To justify an aggressive posture under Prudent Investor, the trustee 
must look to the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding the 
trust, and the case for investing aggressively is better made where the 
corpus is considerable and the term of the trust, extended.  Strategies 
for transferring the family fortune into trust with little to no transfer tax 
                                                 
65
 Iris J. Goodwin, Delegation of Fiduciary Investment Responsibility:  Trustees Explore the Once Taboo, 
TRUSTS & ESTATES, Mar, 1999. 
66
 Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What Every Estate 
Planner Needs to Know, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, Sept. 4-5, 2008 at 689 available at SP020 
ALI-ABA 675. 
67
 DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST 
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS:  WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, 19 October, 2007.  
68
 E.g., Melanie Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense, Fiduciary Standards and Trustee Liability, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2713 at 2728 (2006). 
69
 Supra,     
70
 DON KOZUSKO, PRIVATE TRUST COMPANIES, OPEN-ARCHITECTURE TRUSTS, FAMILY OFFICES, TRUST 
PROTECTORS AND ADVISORS:  WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PLAIN OLD TRUSTEE, 17-18 October, 2007. 
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liability then constitute an important prelude to the exercise of fiduciary 
investment discretion in ways that the family wants, because any tax 
paid is likely to reduce the funds that ultimately find their way into 
trust.  Also important for minimizing the overall tax burden on a family 
fortune is placing funds in a trust of extended duration.  In this section 
we consider the advantages of establishing a long-term trust and 
examine one particularly powerful strategy for transferring funds to it 
with little to no transfer tax liability – the Note-Sale.  If the Note-Sale is 
not adequate to shelter the family fortune, other strategies can be 
brought to bear on what remains – among the more popular being the 
“zero-ed out GRAT.”  These various techniques make possible the 
transfer into perpetual trust of what is effectively tens of millions of 
dollars without the family ever having to pay transfer tax.   
 
a.  The Long-Term Trust.  To take a step back, the need to invest 
subject to the Prudent Investor standard would not arise but for the 
family fortune being in trust.  If the members of family held family 
assets outright, then each generation of the family (as it came into its 
inheritance) would be free to invest – and indeed to risk -- the funds as 
it saw fit.  The question that occurs then is why, for a very wealthy 
family eager to minimize its transfer tax burden, property is likely to be 
transferred into trust.     
 
The simple transfer-tax reason71 that wealthy families put their 
fortunes into trust is that only the initial transfer into trust – the 
transfer in fee simple from the donor to the trustee – is subject to 
transfer tax.  And this is the case, even though multiple, successive 
generations of the family subsequently benefit from the property (as 
equitable owners).   In contrast, if the family fortune were transferred 
outright from parent to child and then from child to grandchild, and so 
on, each of the transfers (all in fee simple) would trigger a tax.  Taken 
together, the multiple instances of taxation as property descended 
from one family member to another, generation to generation, would 
make for a great drain on the family fortune.  But if the property is 
transferred into trust, it is not subject to transfer tax again until the 
trust terminates and the property goes outright to the beneficiaries 
(termed “remaindermen”).  Only after the trust terminates, when those 
remaindermen (now holding the property outright and free of trust) 
choose to transfer the property, will the property again be subject to 
                                                 
71
 Placing assets in trust can also protect them from beneficiaries’ creditors as, generally, credits of a trust 
beneficiary can only “stand in the beneficiary’s shoes” and claim the income or principal that the 
beneficiary is legally entitled to receive at the time he or she is entitled to receive it.  See UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 501(2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2003). See also Charles D. Fox and Michael, 
J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 287 (2002). 
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transfer tax.72   If the property can stay in trust in perpetuity, the 
property is put beyond the transfer tax regime forever. 
 
So, not only is the overall transfer tax burden on multiple generations 
lessened substantially if the property is placed in trust, but also the 
longer the trust lasts – and the more generations of a family that can 
benefit from the property while it is in trust, the greater the overall tax 
savings.  In short, the longer the term of the trust, the more “tax-
efficient” the trust is.   
 
Until the late 1980s, efforts to extend the time horizon for a trust into 
the distant future were thwarted by the common law Rule against 
Perpetuities.73   A movement to repeal the Rule74 has been fairly 
successful, however, and, to date, as many as eighteen states and the 
District of Columbia have eliminated the Rule altogether or amended 
their existing statutes to allow donors of trusts to opt out.75  A trust 
can be now be virtually of infinite duration, provided it is established 
in a “non-perpetuities” jurisdiction.  Leaving aside strategies for 
funding a perpetual trust, the mere fact that trusts can last in 
perpetuity constitutes an enormous advantage for wealthy families, 
                                                 
72
 Many provisions under of the federal transfer tax regime make it advantageous for the trustee to be an 
independent party, placing the exercise of certain aspects of fiduciary discretion outside the family – and 
not in the hands of the donor of any trust or any beneficiary.  For example, neither the donor of a given 
trust nor the beneficiaries of it should control of discretionary distributions of income or principal.  If the 
donor retains control of distributions from the trust, this power can potentially cause inclusion of the 
property subject to the discretion in the donor’s estate. See I.R.C. § 2036, 2038 (2008).  If a beneficiary can 
make distributions to herself or to someone for whom she has a support obligation, this control will under 
certain circumstances be deemed a general power of appointment and cause inclusion of the property 
subject to the power in her estate.  See I.R.C. § 2041 (2008).  Further, if a family member controls 
distributions from a trust where she is not a beneficiary, but where other family members are beneficiaries, 
her control here can also trigger application of the “reciprocal trust doctrine,” especially if she is a 
beneficiary of a second trust, one where those other family members are trustees.  See  United States v. 
Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969).  The consequence of running afoul of these rules is to make property 
once transferred into trust and (supposedly) beyond the reach of the transfer tax regime again subject to tax.  
Where the exercise of fiduciary powers through a family trust company is concerned, however, the Internal 
Revenue Service has recently begun to lay this matter to rest, providing guidance with respect to decision-
making structures within a family trust company that will conform to the requirements of the transfer tax 
regime with respect to discretionary distributions of trust income and principal.   
73
 Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities:  R.I.P for the 
R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2100 (2003). 
74This movement was spearheaded by elements of the estate planning bar and certain banking interests.  See 
Robert H. Sikoff and Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical 
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the 
Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 596 (2005). 
75
 The eighteen states that have eliminated the Rule or allow settlors to opt out are Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,  New Jersey, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakora, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.  In addition, Florida permits a trust 
to last up to 360 years and Nevada, 365.  Utah allows a trust to exist for 1000 years. 
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because once wealth is in a perpetual trust it sits beyond the reach of 
the transfer tax regime forever.76 
 
And the fact that to date only eighteen or so states have eliminated the 
Rule against Perpetuities is no impediment to a wealthy family still 
living in a perpetuities jurisdiction.   Wherever family members live, 
the family simply needs to name a trustee in a non-perpetuities 
jurisdiction who then administers the trust in that state.77  The need 
for a “nexus” with a non-perpetuities jurisdiction does, however, 
mean that, for a family planning to place a family trust company at 
the helm as trustee of a perpetual trust, the family needs to establish 
its trust company in a state that not only permits a modern family trust 
company but also has eliminated the Rule against Perpetuities.  
Fortunately, for the family wanting to establish its own trust company 
and name that entity trustee of a perpetual trust, many of the states 
that have liberalized their laws with respect to forming privately 
owned, family trust companies have also changed their laws with 
respect to the Rule against Perpetuities to make them attractive to 
those looking to place significant wealth in trust with their own trust 
company as trustee.78   
 
b. Funding the Trust.  The fact that great wealth can escape transfer tax 
so long as it is in trust does not eliminate the potential tax when the 
property is initially transferred, an amount that for a family with great 
wealth can still be considerable.  Once a perpetual trust has been 
established, then the scene shifts to strategies to transfer property into it 
with little to no transfer tax liability.  This is accomplished exploiting 
the various credits and exemptions from transfer tax under the Internal 
Revenue Code (included there so that taxpayers of modest means can 
transfer assets without incurring liability).  For the very wealthy, 
however, the trick is not to use these credits and exemptions “dollar-
for-dollar”  -- i.e., a dollar of credit or exemption applied to shelter a 
dollar of family wealth.  Instead, sophisticated planning techniques 
(like the Note-Sale) subject assets to discounting techniques and then in 
various way “leverage” the credits and exemptions, so that the dollar 
limitations as per the Internal Revenue Code become more apparent 
than real.   
 
                                                 
76
 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS  120.1, at 
120-1 to –2 (2d ed. Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1993).  See also JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & 
MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 822-23 ( 2d ed. Foundation Press 2003). 
77
 Of course, the family could also employ an individual trustee resident in jurisdiction or big bank trustee 
authorized to conduct trust business in the jurisdiction with the caveats stated supra,  .     
78
 That is, trusts that name the family trust company as the initial trustee.  Trusts for which the family trust 
company is successor trustee are another question.  The family trust company cannot create nexus with 
respect to all important legal issues for a trust that names as initial trustee a person domiciled in another 
jurisdiction or another trust company located in another jurisdiction.   
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(i) The Unified Credit and the GST Exemption.  Like all non-charitable 
gratuitous transfers, transfers into trust are subject to Estate Tax (if 
made at death) or to Gift Tax (if made during life).  Shelter from the 
Estate and Gift Tax is available, however, in the form of the Unified 
Credit.  If the trust benefits grandchildren and more remote 
descendants, then in addition to Estate or Gift Tax, transfers to the trust 
will be subject to Generation-Skipping Tax.  Generation-skipping 
transfers can also be sheltered, however -- with the GST Exemption.   
 
With respect to the Unified Credit, every transferor currently has a 
lifetime Credit sufficient to shelter up to $3.5 million in transfers made 
during life or at death.  At present, however, only $1 million of the 
Credit is available to be used during life, and, accordingly, this amount 
becomes the operative figure for many planning strategies.  This is 
because, even though the Unified Credit can be applied to transfers 
made at death, most of the more sophisticated tax planning strategies 
make use of transfers not at death but during life – gifts essentially.  
There are reasons for this, the most important of which is that gifts can 
be timed – effectively giving the taxpayer significant control over the 
value of the gift.  This control over the timing of the transfer – and 
thereby the value of the gift for transfer tax purposes -- is a large 
element of not only the note-sale, but also other strategies as well. 79     
 
But there is an additional transfer tax that is applicable to transfers 
made to a long-term or perpetual trust – the Generation-Skipping 
Transfer Tax.  The Estate and Gift Tax is designed to tax wealth every 
generation.  Nevertheless, as we have noted, long-term trusts benefiting 
successive generations can neatly avoid the successive impositions of 
estate and gift tax even as the property in trust becomes available to 
grandchildren and more remote descendants. The Generation-Skipping 
Transfer Tax was devised by Congress in 198680 to close this loophole 
and subject generation-skipping transfers (whether made outright or in 
trust) to a separate and additional tax.  Thus, like all non-charitable 
gratuitous transfers, generation-skipping transfers are subject either to 
the Gift Tax (if they occur during life) or to the Estate Tax (if they 
occur at death).  But where the transfer is to or for the benefit of 
grandchildren or more remote descendants, the transfer is also subject 
to GST Tax (in addition to Estate or Gift Tax). 81  Taken together, the 
                                                 
79
 A second reason that gifts are more “tax efficient” than transfers at death is that gifts are tax-exclusive 
while transfers at death are tax-inclusive.  This means that the funds used to pay gift tax are not themselves 
subject to tax, while funds used to pay estate tax form part of the base against which the rate of taxation is 
applied.  See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 12 (23d ed. 
West Group 2006).  This second reason is less relevant here in that no transfer tax will be paid. 
80
 A federal tax on generation-skipping transfers was first enacted in 1976.  This tax was considered 
conceptually flawed and it was substantially repealed and a new tax was enacted in 1986.  See, CAMPFIELD, 
DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 727 (23d ed. West Group 2006) 
81
 Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax is applicable to transfer made to or for the benefit of a “skip person” 
as per I.R.C. § 2613(a)(1), meaning any person of a generation more than one below the transferor (such as 
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Estate or Gift Tax and the GST Tax make for a virtually confiscatory 
imposition of tax.82   
 
For those seeking to circumvent the transfer tax regime with long-term 
trusts, such is the bad news.  There is also good news, however, in the 
form of a lifetime exemption from the GST Tax, currently in the 
amount of $3.5 million, the entire amount of which can be used to 
shelter transfers made during life or at death.  While (unlike the Unified 
Credit) the entire GST Exemption of $3.5 million can be used for 
transfers during life if the taxpayer so chooses, the transfer will also be 
subject to the Gift Tax – and there the Unified Credit will shelter only 
$1 million of the transfer.  Consequently, even though a transfer in 
excess of $1 million could be sheltered from GST Tax, the excess 
would be subject to Gift Tax.  Therefore, the $1 million amount 
sheltered by the Unified Credit operates for most wealthy donors as a 
cap here as well, as families tend to be disinclined to incur tax for 
lifetime transfers.83 
 
(ii) The Note-Sale.  Transfers to a perpetual trust will then be subject 
both to Gift Tax and to Generation-Skipping Tax and must be sheltered 
from both unless a tax is to be paid.  The Note-Sale is a strategy for 
sheltering the funding of a perpetual trust and constitutes a two-stroke 
                                                                                                                                                 
a grandchild).  “Direct skips” to such persons are taxable and would include gifts outright and gifts in trusts 
that benefit solely skip persons.  Tax is typically paid when such trusts are established.  Where trusts 
benefit both skip and non-skip (i.e., children) persons, then “taxable distributions” of income and principal 
from such trusts as well as “taxable terminations” from such trusts (where property goes outright to one or 
more skip persons) are subject to tax.  See I.R.C. §§ 2612(b), 2612(a)(1)(A) (2008). See, CAMPFIELD, 
DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 735-36 (23d ed. West Group 2006) 
82
 See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 735-36 (23d ed. 
West Group 2006) 
83
 Because Gift Tax will have to be paid if the taxpayer makes lifetime transfers in excess of $1 million, 
transfers to a perpetual trust are unlikely to be made in excess of $1 million.  This is particularly the case at 
this time.  While paying tax is never appealing, it is especially unattractive in this era which is one of 
certain change where the transfer tax regime is concerned.  The fruition of George W. Bush’s 2000 
presidential platform of eliminating transfer taxes (what he called “death taxes”), the Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 provided for repeal of the Estate Tax for those dying after December 
31, 2009 and for repeal of the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax for generation-skipping transfers taking 
place after the same date.  When Congress realized the costs of a permanent repeal, however, they back-
peddled, deciding to phase out these taxes gradually, over the next nine years, then to have one year (from 
December 31, 2009 to January 1, 2011) in which these two transfer taxes were repealed, but then (absent 
additional legislation) to repeal the “repeal” effective January 1, 2011.  This means that, absent additional 
legislation, the repealed estate and generation-skipping taxes and all the phased in changes in rates and 
exemptions as well as all other changes wrought by the 2001 Act, will come back into effect on January 1, 
2011. If no additional legislation is passed and the repeal of the repeal actually occurs, then the Estate Tax 
and the Generation-Skipping Tax as it existed prior to the 2001 Act would spring back to again be the law 
of the land.  Nevertheless, questions remain concerning the size of the Unified Credit going forward and 
more than speculation that, whatever the amount of the Unified Credit, it will (like the Generation-Skipping 
Tax Exemption) be available for use in its entirety during life or at death.  Clearly under these 
circumstances, it would be a rare client indeed who could be advised to incur a gift tax. Jonathan Weisman, 
Obama Plans to Keep Estate Tax  Democrats Want to Freeze Levy at Current Levels, WALL ST. J., January 
12, 2009 at A1.   
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finesse of the meager $1 million of Unified Credit applicable to gifts 
and the Generation-Skipping Tax Exemption that it effectively caps.   
 
A. Step One:  The Valuation Envelope.  If the GST Exemption and Gift 
Tax Credit are applied dollar-for-dollar, $1 million of GST Exemption 
and the current Gift Tax Credit will shelter only $1 million of assets.  
There are, however, more tax-efficient ways to make gifts and to use 
the GST Exemption as well as the Gift Tax Credit.  Family assets84 are 
made eligible for valuation discounting by first (before they are 
transferred into trust) swallowing them in a family limited partnership, 
a close corporation, or a limited liability company.  This entity will be 
capitalized into voting and non-voting shares and, for the time being, 
the head of the family retains both.   
 
At this point the stage is set to make more effective use of the GST 
Exemption and Gift Tax Credit.  The non-voting shares are now 
eligible for a valuation discount, for both lack of marketability (because 
they represent an interest in a closely-held entity)85 and lack of control 
(because they have no voting rights).86  Conservative planners would 
generally apply a 40% discount under these circumstances.87  So assets 
that would be worth $1 million (if held free of the closely-held entity) 
                                                 
84
 Assets that might be transferred into this closely-held envelope include a family business (an operating 
company which may itself be closely-held), publicly-traded securities, real estate, private equity, etc.  Once 
the closely-held envelope is created and assets have been transferred to it, the head of the family takes back 
the voting and non-voting shares.  See, Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving 
Wealth into the Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at  68.   
85
 Discounts as high as 35% are commonly applied in valuing interests in closely-held businesses – that is 
to say, in valuing interests for which there is little to no market because they are not publicly traded.  
Valuing closely-held interests begins by reference to comparable assets that are publicly-traded.  Then, 
assuming there is as no ready market for the particular interests in question, a discount is applied under the 
assumption that a buyer would not pay as much for such interests.  See Rev. Rul. 59-60.  (If any stock is 
also subject to restrictions on sale, the marketability discount can be substantially greater.  See  Estate of 
McClatchy v. Comm’r., 147 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir., 1998).)  Note, however, that the Internal Revenue Service 
can resist or seek to reduce a marketability discount where a closely-held entity is holding assets that are 
readily marketable.  See  McCord v. Comm’r., 120 T.C. 358 (2003) concerning two limited partnerships, 
where one-third of one partnership and two-thirds of a second partnership consisted in marketable 
securities or interests in real estate holding partnerships.  The taxpayer claimed a 35% discount for lack of 
marketability, but the Tax Court reduced the discount to 20%.  Even in this instance, however, some 
discount was deemed justified given the partnership envelope.   
86
 The ability to obtain a discount for lack of control even where all the interests in the closely-held entity 
are owned within a family (or by trusts for their benefit) is the progeny of Estate of Bright v. Unites States, 
658 F.2d 999 (1981). Bright vindicated a long established precedent that attribution should not apply to 
lump together family members’ stock for valuation purposes under the transfer tax regime.  See also, Rev. 
Rul. 93-12( where the Service acquiesced in Bright).  See further discussion of the significance of Bright in 
Note    , infra. 
87
 In the past courts have granted a single discount percentage, such as 40%, without segregating the 
discount attributable to minority status from that attributable to lack of marketability.  It is important to 
recognize the distinction between the discount for lack of control and that for lack of marketability, 
however, because in recent years the courts have tended (quite properly) to analyze these discounts 
separately in arriving at a discount appropriate in a given situation.  See, Estate of McClatchy v. Comm’r., 
147 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir., 1998).   
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can now be valued at $600,000.  Accordingly, $1 million of the GST 
Tax Exemption and the Gift Tax Credit can now be used to shelter 
assets that would have a value of approximately $1.667 million were 
they held free of the closely-held entity.  Note also that these amounts 
will double in the case of a married couple planning together. 
 
The head of the family then transfers $1 million in cash or equivalents 
to the perpetual trust.88  Under the Note-Sale strategy, this transfer (the 
“seeding” of the trust) is the only transfer that is actually a “gift” for 
Gift Tax purposes and it is here that the Gift Tax Credit and $1 million 
of the GST Exemption are applied.   
  
(B) Step Two:  Purchase of Discounted Assets.  The placement of a 
family’s wealth into a closely-held entity and the establishment of a 
perpetual trust are preliminary steps.  While some advantage would be 
gained if the non-voting (now discounted) shares were simply 
contributed to the perpetual trust, this would not realize the full 
potential of the Exemption or the Credit.  At this juncture the trustee of 
the trust (here the Family Trust Company) steps forward and purchases 
$10 million of the non-voting shares from the head of the family and 
gives back an installment note89 in the amount of $9 million, along with 
the $1 million (just received when the trust was seeded) as a down 
payment.  Per the note, the trustee is required to pay interest-only 
during the term, with principal due in nine years (at the end of the term) 
in the form of a balloon payment, with a right of prepayment.90   
 
Courtesy of the trustee’s purchase of the assets in exchange for the 
note, the fair market value of the assets that ultimately fund the trust is 
$10 million instead of $1 million (the amount contributed gratuitously).  
Further, because the assets were initially placed in a closely-held entity, 
the $10 million of assets that ultimately fund the trust would be worth 
                                                 
88
 Either cash or discounted assets can be used here, although the real advantage of the discounted assets 
materializes in Step Two.  See Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth 
into the Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68.   
89
 The terms of the loan are governed by many considerations under the transfer tax regime.  First, the loan 
will be an intra-family loan and so, to avoid gift-loan treatment under I.R.C. § 7872, it must bear an interest 
rate of at least the Applicable Federal Rate.  This is a market rate of interest determined by reference to the 
average yield on United States government obligations.  As it works out, however, the rate is generally 
more than fair to the borrower when compared to rates that are likely to be commercially available.  The 
nine-year term will make it a long-term loan under § 7872 and make it eligible for the long-term interest 
rate (usually a lower rate than the shorter term rates).  See I.R.C. §§ 7872(f)(2), 1274(d)(1)(C) (2008).  The 
Applicable Federal Rates are re-determined each month.  I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(B) (2008).  For term loans of 
more than three years, the market interest rates for longer term obligations are used, depending on the term 
of the loan.  In the case of a term loan, the Applicable Federal Rate for the entire period of the loan is 
determined by the rate for the month in which the loan is made. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(A) (2008).  In the case 
of a demand loan (which has no application in the Note-Sale), the rate varies from month to month as the 
Federal rates are re-determined.  I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(B) (2008). 
90
 The loan will be a intra-family loan.  So to avoid gift-loan treatment the interest rate will be determined 
by Applicable Federal Rate.  The 9-year term will make it a long-term loan.  See I.R.C. § 7872 (2008). 
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approximately $16.67 million if they were held free of this entity – or 
$20 million and approximately $33.3 million, respectively, in the case 
of a married couple. 
 
The $10 million amount of the note is only ten times the $1 million 
gift, a margin that is not to great that it vitiates the claim that the entire 
transaction has a business purpose,91 thereby placing the transaction 
beyond the scope of the transfer tax regime.  The goal here is to 
eliminate any implication that the loan is a donative transfer for 
purposes of the transfer tax regime.  Under the Gift Tax Regulations, 
the transfer is not a gift if it is “a sale, exchange, or other transfer of 
property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is 
bona fide, arm’s-length, and free of any donative intent).”92 Other 
elements of the transaction also lend support to the claim that the Note 
has a business purpose, including the timing of the purchase of the 
shares relative to the funding of the trust where at least a six-month’s 
lag is recommended.93 
                                                 
91
 The business purpose of the closely-held entity also lends support to the business purpose of the entire 
transaction.  The closely-held entity needs a genuine business purpose beyond its role in a tax-minimization 
strategy.  Such a purpose could be, for example, the need to bring managerial integration to a diverse and 
complex portfolio of assets.  Absence of some bona fide business purpose will invite numerous objections 
(see Note   , infra) from the Internal Revenue Service and the courts such that the closely-held entity is 
likely to be viewed a mere tax avoidance artifice.  This is especially the case where this “wrapper” holds 
largely passive investment assets (such as marketable securities) that could just as well be held outright.  
See Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium 
Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68.  Regarding the inclusion of passive investments, see 
McCord v. Comm., 120 T.C. 358 (2003), discussed in note   , infra.  In addition, care must be taken that the 
closely-held entity is used in a way consistent with a business purpose.  For example, all assets should not 
be transferred into the closely-held entity necessitating the payment of household obligations out of the 
closely-held entity.  See also, Note   , infra. 
92
 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (2007).  To escape Gift Tax treatment, it is also important here to establish 
that the transfer was for “adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.”  Id.  The element of 
consideration not only removes the transfer from the realm of the gift tax, but also ensures that the value of 
the trust will not be includible in the donor’s estate under Sections 2036 and 2038 if she were to die during 
the term of the Note.  Attention to the valuation of assets transferred into trust is then important. (The plan 
here is to have the note repaid before the donor dies – thus the prepayment provision of the Note.)  In the 
event, however, that the donor dies during the term of the Note, the Note itself will be in the donor’s estate, 
but it may be eligible for discounting because of its long-term and low interest rate.  Richard A. Oshins and 
Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, 
October 1998, at 68.  Furthermore and most importantly, however, if the Note winds up in the donor’s 
estate, the appreciated assets of the trust do not.  See “opportunity shifting,” infra,  . 
93
 Recently, the Internal Revenue Service has attacked the use of closely-held entities as discounting 
devices by relying on I.R.C. Section 2036(a).  Several decades of case law (in which the Internal Revenue 
Service has acquiesced) preclude the Service from attacking the discount by aggregating the interests of 
family members (and trusts for their benefit) in determining whether the value of closely-held interests 
should be discounted for lack of control.  See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (1981) (in 
which the Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in Rev. Rul. 93-12).  In two cases with similar facts, the 
Internal Revenue Service has more successfully applied Section 2036(a), however, as it includes in the 
decedent’s gross estate any asset as to which the decedent has retained a right to the income from the 
property.  In two cases with similar facts, the Internal Revenue Service has successively applied Section 
2036(a) to include the underlying assets held in any entity in a decedent transferor’s estate where the 
partnership was formed only shortly before the decedent’s death (lending an aura of the testamentary 
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The Note-Sale also exploits aspects of the income tax regime.  The trust 
will be drafted so that, during the life of the donor, it will be a “grantor 
trust” for income tax purposes.  This “grantor trust status” is created by 
turning to the parts of the Internal Revenue Code that govern the 
income tax regime and including a provision in the trust that 
intentionally violates one or more of the grantor trust rules under IRC 
Sections 673 through 679 -- -- for example, by giving the donor the 
right to exchange property in the trust for property of equivalent 
value.94  Whatever power is included here, it is unlikely that the donor 
will exercise it.  This does not matter.  The mere presence of the power 
in the trust agreement will ensure that the donor is considered the 
“owner” of trust assets for income tax purposes and – most importantly 
– transactions between the trust and the donor (the Note-Sale, for 
example) will be ignored for income tax purposes.95  Thus, while the 
sale of the non-voting shares to the trustee would otherwise be a 
realization event for income tax purpose, no gain will have to be 
recognized.  For income tax purposes, it is as if the trust does not exist 
and the transaction did not happen.96 
 
(iii)  Other Strategies.  Effective as the Note-Sale might be for 
transferring tens of millions of dollars with the application of only the 
$1 million Gift Tax Credit and $1 million of the GST Exemption, many 
families still find themselves with considerable wealth remaining in the 
hands of the donor generation.  Other strategies with which to transfer 
                                                                                                                                                 
substitute to the transaction) and the decedent transferred nearly all his net worth to the closely-held entity, 
necessitating that he rely on income from the entity for his support until his death (the last being critical to 
the application of Section 2036(a).  Finally, the entity was funded almost entirely with marketable 
securities.  See Strangi v. Comm’r., 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r., 382 
F.3d 367 (3rd  Cir. 2004).  In another case, however, Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th 
Cir. 2004), the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary result.  While as in Thompson and Strangi, the decedent had 
transferred property to a family limited partnership not long before his death, in Kimbell there were good 
business reasons for placing the assets (which included oil and gas working interests) in a partnership.  
Further the transferor retained sufficient property to provide for his own support. Advisers maintain that 
care must be taken to see that the closely-held entity is created well in advance of the death of the 
transferor, that there is a business purpose (other than tax avoidance) for creation of the entity, that all the 
formalities of maintaining and operating the closely-held entity are observed, that assets transferred to the 
entity are operating assets requiring management (rather than passive investment assets, such as marketable 
securities), and that the decedent has retained sufficient wealth to support herself without receiving income 
from the entity. 
94
 This planning opportunity is possible because the grantor trust rules (which are primarily creatures of the 
income tax regime) do not work in pari materia with the gift tax regime.  Care must be taken, however, to 
make certain that this retained power offends only with respect to the income tax regime, but does not 
vitiate the transfer for purpose of the transfer tax regime.  For purposes of the Estate and Gift Tax or indeed 
the Generation-skipping Tax, it is essential that the transfer be complete.  
95
 The IRS has opined in Rev. Rul. 85-13 and in several private letter rulings. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-13, 
1985-1 C.B. 184. 
96
 Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium Part 
II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 6. See also  Randall D. Roth, The Intentional Use of Tax-
Defective Trusts, Presentation at the University of Miami, 26th Institution. On Estate Planning (1992). 
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additional wealth with little to no transfer tax are available, however, 
and this is the case even if the donor generation has completely 
exhausted its $1 million ($2 million in the case of a couple) gift tax 
Unified Credit.  Indeed, especially popular in such circumstances is the 
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT) and in particular its most 
aggressive application, the “zeroed out” GRAT.   
 
The GRAT is a creature of reforms enacted in 1990 that resulted in the 
addition of Chapter 14 of the Estate and Gift Tax with its special 
valuation rules.97  These strict valuation rules are applicable to certain 
transfers in trust, especially those where the donor generation retains a 
present interest (structured as an annuity98), while transferring a 
remainder interest to the donee generation (thereby making a gift to 
them). 
 
Consistent with the Chapter 14 valuation rules, if the income interest 
retained by the donor generation is large enough, the actuarial value of 
the remainder – the gift to the donee generation – will be zero or very 
close to it, making for a “zeroed-out GRAT.”99  Where the value of the 
remainder is zero or nearly so, there will little to no gift tax due on the 
transfer – a welcome outcome where the donor generation has already 
exhausted its gift tax Unified Credit.  The value of the remainder 
interest will be zero where the donor generation retains a very large 
income interest.  To satisfy this income interest will require (pursuant 
to the required valuation methodology) not only the income produced 
                                                 
97
 These valuation rules were meant to eliminate certain capitalization strategies by which closely-held 
companies were capitalized so that the donor generation could retain a preferred interest in a family 
business, while the younger generation received common stock.  These interests were subjected to various 
favorable valuation techniques so that the interest passing to the donee generation was often valued at a 
fraction of its worth at the time of the transfer. See, CAMPFIELD, DICKENSON & TURNIER, TAXATION OF 
ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 230-36 (23d ed. West Group 2006). 
98
 Of course, the value of the gift also reflects the retained annuity.  This income interest must consist in 
annual payments of either (1) a fixed dollar amount or (2) an amount equal to a fixed percentage of the trust 
value, determined annually. See I.R.C. §§ 2702(b)(1)-(2) (2008).   Where an income interest does not 
conform to these requirements, the income interest will be valued at zero – potentially making for an 
expensive gift to the donee generation of 100% of the value of the property transferred into trust. By 
imposing such constraints upon the terms of the retained interest (if it is to be deemed worth anything at all 
for transfer tax purposes), the Congress has sought to ensure that the future interest transferred to the donee 
generation will submit to valuation techniques that realistically capture what that generation is receiving.  
I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A) (2008).   
99
 The “zeroed out” GRAT was for some time deemed controversial as the Internal Revenue Service and 
the estate planning bar argued about the meaning and interpretation of Example 5 under Reg. 25.2702-3(e).  
The IRS had argued that the retained interest should be valued as an annuity payable for the shorter of the 
term of the retained annuity or the grantor’s death.  This analysis would reduce the value of the retained 
interest and therefore increase the value of the remainder (the gift).  The Tax Court, examining the 
legislative history of section 2702 and concluded that Reg. 25.2702-3(e) Example 5 is an “unreasonable 
interpretation and invalid extension” of section 2702.  Walton v. Comm’r 115 T.C. 589, 604 (2000).  The 
Commissioner has since acquiesced in the Tax Court holding and has issued Regulations affirming the 
result in the case.  See  Rev. Rul. 2003-72, 2003-2 C.B. 964; Treas. Reg. 25.2702-3(e) (2007) Examples 5, 
6, and 8. 
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by the trust assets, but also a return of principal.  At the end of the 
annuity term, nothing will be left to be distributed to the donee 
generation – or at least per the Chapter 14 valuation rules. 100  Of 
course, these calculations are predicated on the value of the property on 
the date it is transferred into trust together with the imputed rate of 
appreciation.  The donor is betting, however, that the reality will be 
very different – a point to which we will return momentarily.   
 
But there are drawbacks to the GRAT.  Probably its biggest 
disadvantage is that it does not readily lend itself to a perpetual trust.  
The donor’s GST Exemption cannot be applied to shelter the property 
transferred to the GRAT until the expiration of the donor’s present 
interest.  By that point, if all has gone according to plan, the assets will 
have appreciated far in excess of their initial worth.  In short, this 
means that the GST Exemption cannot be leveraged here, but must be 
applied dollar-for-dollar.101  For this reason GRAT remaindermen are 
always children and not more remote generations (to avoid generation-
skipping liability).102  Absent application of the GST Exemption, 
transfers to subsequent generations will be subject to transfer tax. 
                                                 
100
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a member of the family that founded Wal-Mart Stores, to make transfers in trust for her daughters.  The 
mother transferred 7.2 million shares of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. into trusts for her daughters, the value of the 
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Other “high-tech” strategies also remain – large designs that again 
allow a wealthy family to minimize its transfer tax liability, even where 
the Unified Credit and Generation-Skipping Tax Exemption have been 
exhausted.  For example, the charitable lead trust is a split-interest trust 
that can allow a family to transfer significant wealth to children and 
more remote generations with little to no transfer tax liability.  As with 
the GRAT, the donor can effectively “zero out” the charitable lead trust 
by setting the payments to charity high enough so that the present value 
of the lead interest to charity will be equal to (or almost equal to) the 
full value of the assets contributed to the trust.  If the donor zeros out 
the trust, the value of the gift to the donee generation will be zero or 
close to it and again no transfer tax will be owed.   
 
(iv) Beating the Imputed Rate of Appreciation.  If any of these 
strategies are to “work,” however, at a minimum the assets have to 
appreciate at a rate higher than the interest rate on the loan (in the case 
of the Note-Sale) or higher than the imputed rate of growth under 
Chapter 14 (in the case of the GRAT or the charitable lead trust).  In 
the case of the Note-Sale, this is highly likely to happen.  The 
discounting of the assets by virtue of the closely-held “wrapper” 
ultimately ensures the assets that make their way into the trust are more 
valuable than the amount the trustee has paid for them.   
 
Finally, valuation discounts and leveraging notwithstanding, any of 
these strategies realizes its greatest potential where the underlying 
assets (those transferred to the closely-held entity) hold significant 
appreciation potential.  The prospects for transferring wealth between 
generations without having to pay transfer tax increase exponentially if 
the property placed into the closely-held entity is a business just being 
formed, a new product being developed, a new location for an existing 
business, an investment opportunity, or a closely-held business soon to 
go public. Ideally, the assets transferred into the “envelope” are 
significant interests in a venture that can reasonably be predicted to 
explode in value.  It is here that $33 or so million (itself transferred 
without paying transfer tax) can easily become $100 million.103   
 
Of course, if these assets are going to be transferred into trust (even as 
non-voting share of a closely-held wrapper), the family requires a 
                                                                                                                                                 
difference in requirements of the valuation regimen applicable in each case.  The consequence is that the 
rate of appreciation that must be achieved for the Note-Sale to be successful is likely to be lower that the 
rate for the GRAT.  See, Richard A. Oshins and Steven J. Oshins, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the 
Next Millennium Part II, TRUSTS & ESTATES, October 1998, at 68.   
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 The timing of the transfer has to be carefully calculated, however, for example, in the instance of an 
initial public offering where the stock is to be valued before the public offering.  If this value is to be 
sustained, the more time between the transfer into trust and the public offering, the better.   
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trustee that is willing to hold such an investment.  At this point, the 
stage is set to consider the legal discretion a trustee might have to do 
just that.   
 
Part III:  Putting the Pedal to the Metal:  Fiduciary Investment Discretion 
 
If the dissipation of assets once they are in trust is indeed the last 
frontier in the preservation of great fortunes, it is no longer plausible to 
chalk this up simply to the drain of transfer tax.  Indeed, wealthy 
families whose property has long been in trust (where it was safe from 
the dissipating pressure of the fisc) have for decades appreciated the 
perniciousness effects of a conservative fiduciary investment 
philosophy (supported by a conservative law governing fiduciary 
investment discretion)104.  For the more recently wealthy, concern with 
fiduciary investing has come front and center.  These families are 
relying on tax-minimizing strategies (such as the Note-Sale) that not 
only transfer assets into trust with little to no transfer tax liability, but 
make integral to the plan a certain rate of appreciation with respect to 
transferred assets.  These modern strategies can only succeed if the 
property transferred consists in appreciating, potentially volatile assets 
– and, moreover, that those assets do indeed appreciate, volatility 
notwithstanding.  Moreover, these families understand the element of 
risk that was in play in making their fortunes and are looking to bring 
this entrepreneurial mindset to the management of these assets going 
forward.  The modern fiduciary duty of care can contemplate an 
aggressive investment posture on the part of a trustee, especially where 
the trust is holding a large portfolio and the time horizon as per the trust 
terms is long enough.  The new standard of care makes it possible to do 
with property in trust what has rarely been done before105 -- and 
potentially great fortunes do not merely cease to wane, but can actually 
appreciate.  There is simply one proviso – that the fiduciary is willing 
to embrace the new standard of fiduciary investment responsibility in 
all its potential. 
 
The common law trust has existed for centuries but only in recent 
decades has the law governing fiduciary investing done other than 
encourage trustees to conserve trust property.  For many years the 
trustee’s primary duty was to avoid risk, including the risk inherent in 
investing assets for growth.106  And a case can be made that this risk-
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averse attitude comported with donors’ expectations, especially in 
earlier eras when the asset placed in trust was almost certainly land and 
the only reason to transfer property to future generations in trust (rather 
than outright) was to avoid transfer tax.107  When the likely res ceased 
to be land and became a portfolio of marketable securities, however, 
donors and their beneficiaries began to rankle under a law that looked 
only to conserve assets at nominal value, while the purchasing power of 
those assets declined.  Donors and beneficiaries alike noted that 
between inflation and trustees’ commissions, assets placed in trust 
dwindled, however modest the distributions to beneficiaries as per the 
trust agreement.   
  
a.  Prudent Man.  This focus on conserving the face value of trust assets 
was mandated under the earlier law governing investment of trust 
assets, the Prudent Man Rule, usually dated from the 1830 case, 
Harvard College v. Amory.108  In Amory, the court directed that in 
investing trustees should proceed as “men of prudence, discretion and 
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but 
in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the 
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be 
invested.”  Soon canonical, the Prudent Man rule with its emphasis on 
capital preservation and distaste for speculation made its way into the 
Restatement of Trusts109 in 1935 and later in 1959 into the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts.110  Underscoring the duty to preserve capital, the 
Restatement Second directed the trustee to  “to make such investments 
and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own 
property having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount 
and regularity of the income to be derived[.]”111   
 
Under Prudent Man, the methodology of risk assessment required the 
trustee weigh each asset in isolation rather than as an element of a 
larger portfolio.  This approach had the consequence of prohibiting 
certain investments entirely and rendering others (such and U.S. 
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 John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 625, at 633 (1995). 
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 Harvard v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).  Harvard v. Amory augured a degree of progress, 
however, as in the 19th and early 20th centuries, most states mandated that trustees confine their investment 
discretion to a statutory list of investments suitable for trustees – usually government bonds, first 
mortgages, and preferred stocks.  Even common stock was severely discouraged.  Amory still prohibited 
investments “for the purpose of speculation” and continued to emphasize the preservation of capital before 
all else.  Finally, between the 1930s through the 1960s, a majority of states finally replaced legal list 
statutes with the prudent man rule. See Jesse Dukeminier and James F. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual 
Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1336 (2003). The Massachusetts rule represented a great advance by 
abandoning the attempt to specify approved types of investment.  See also John H. Langbein, The Uniform 
Prudent investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641 (1996). 
109
 RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 227 (1935). 
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investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644-45 (1996). 
31 
 
Treasuries where principle was for all intents and purposes guaranteed) 
inherently safe.  Furthermore, trustees shied away from new types of 
investments.  And delegation of investment authority (something that 
the introduction of new types of investments might require) was simply 
verboten.112   
 
b.  Prudent Investor.  About twenty years ago, however, the law 
governing the investment of trust assets began to change.  Sophisticated 
studies examining financial markets in light of modern “Portfolio 
Theory” suggested that complaints of settlors and beneficiaries bespoke 
economic reality, especially once trusts were no longer invested in 
land, but rather in marketable securities.  The law responded with a 
new standard to govern the investment of trust funds.  Prudent Investor 
supplanted Prudent Man.113 
 
As a theory of efficient markets, modern Portfolio Theory provided a 
new understanding of the risk inherent in investing (including investing 
in trust) and suggested a new methodology by which to manage it.  At 
its core efficient market theory teaches us that it is impossible to predict 
which securities will do better or worse.  Simply stated, each security 
has risks.  Even an investment (such as a U.S. Treasury bill) seeming to 
conserve trust principal at its face value is itself not without risk – if 
nothing else, the risk of inflation.114  All that can be done with respect 
to risk is to manage it.   
 
To manage risk begins by appreciating that every security is subject to 
risk of two types.115  Market risk plagues all securities indiscriminately 
and reflects general economic and political conditions – for example, 
the risk of an attack by a foreign power (such as the attacks on 9-11), a 
general economic downturn (such as the current global recession), or a 
change in interest rates by the Federal Reserve.   With respect to market 
risk, little can be done to mitigate volatility.  The only comfort to be 
had lies in the knowledge that, when the investment is made, the 
market factors this risk into the return.  A higher market risk garners a 
higher rate of return.   Market risk is compensated risk.116   
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In contrast, non-market or industry risk is the risk that something will 
affect the fortunes of a particular industry or firm – for example, an ore 
necessary to production of a particular product becomes unavailable.  
And within a particular firm, there is the further risk that a key person 
dies unexpectedly or that a fire makes a plant inoperable.117  Where 
industry risk is concerned, however, the return does not reflect the risk.  
The only way to manage industry risk is through diversification of 
investments within a portfolio – diversification among financial sectors 
and within financial sectors.118   
 
Thus, given that no one can outsmart the market and that risk is 
inherent in all investing, an investor can only proceed by determining 
the level of volatility (including the risk of inflation) that she is willing 
to accept in exchange for the return she hopes to receive.  This will 
determine the level of market risk she assumes.  Then, with respect to 
non-market risk, an investor diversifies her portfolio bearing in mind 
the level of market risk she has chosen.119 
 
In 1987, there began a fundamental revision in the law governing the 
investment of trust property in light of this theory of efficient markets.  
Especially important were its implications for the concept of “prudent 
investment.”  The American Law Institute started revising the 
Restatement of Trusts in 1991 and released the final text in 1992.  The 
Uniform Law Commission followed suit and in 1994 codified the 
revised Restatement principles as the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.120  
To date, XX states have adopted some version of the Uniform Act. 
 
In this new era, trust investment law has set aside its preoccupation 
with speculation and speculative investments.  “The universe of 
investment products changes incessantly,” so the Uniform Act 
counsels.  “Investments that were at one time thought too risky, such as 
equities, or more recently, futures, are now used in fiduciary portfolios.  
By contrast, the investment that was at one time thought ideal for trusts, 
the long-term bond, has been discovered to import a level of risk and 
volatility – in this case, inflation risk – that had not been 
anticipated.”121  As part and parcel of this re-framing of the concept of 
prudent investing, the law also jettisoned the idea that some categories 
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of investments are per se prudent and others imprudent,122 in favor of 
directing trustees to develop a risk profile appropriate to the particular 
trust in question.  “Trust beneficiaries are better protected by … close 
attention to risk/return objectives…than in attempts to identify 
categories of investment that are per se prudent or imprudent.”123  The 
trustee is now to invest for “risk and return objectives reasonably suited 
to the trust.”124  And the degree of risk appropriate for a particular trust 
is highly situational.  “Tolerance for risk varies greatly with the 
financial and other circumstances of the investor, or in the case of a 
trust, with the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of 
the beneficiaries[.]”  Indeed, if the “main purpose” of the particular 
trust “is to support an elderly widow of modest means,” that trust “will 
have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion 
of great wealth.”125   
 
But addressing market risk through appropriate risk and return 
objectives is not all the law now requires of fiduciaries.  Industry risk is 
not to be ignored either.  Portfolio Theory (when it informs the law of 
fiduciary duty) mandates a diversified portfolio.  Although 
diversification had a place in the old law governing fiduciary 
investing,126 the new law enlarges upon its significance.  Indeed, the 
requirement of diversification serves in the new law to propel the entire 
methodology of Prudent Investor toward a comprehensive perspective, 
so that attention focuses on the portfolio as a whole with any particular 
security justifiable only in relation to the rest of the account.127  As the 
Uniform Act counsels, “A trustee’s investment and management 
decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation 
but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole.” The official 
Comment continues:  “An investment that might be imprudent standing 
alone can become prudent if undertaken in sensible relation to other 
trust assets, or to other nontrust assets.”128  Not only is no asset without 
risk, but also no asset is inherently appropriate or inappropriate except 
in relation to the whole portfolio. 
 
If the requirement of diversification propels the new regime toward a 
comprehensive perspective in evaluating risk, this same comprehensive 
perspective can at times argue for a suspension of the requirement of 
diversification.  That is to say, although diversification is central to the 
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methodology of Prudent Investor, even diversification can be set aside 
if under the circumstances it is prudent to do so.  We will return to this 
point momentarily. 
 
A final point about the influence of modern Portfolio Theory on the law 
of fiduciary investing:  Whereas the Prudent Man statute forbade the 
delegation of fiduciary investment responsibility,129 the new law is 
much more tolerant of delegation and even encourages it in certain 
situations.130  Such tolerance is a natural accompaniment to the 
recognition that any asset is potentially an appropriate investment.  If 
any asset is a possible investment in trust, then a trustee potentially 
needs to be competent with respect to a breadth of possible 
investments, including complex, state-of-the-art vehicles heretofore 
rarely found in fiduciary accounts -- futures, derivatives, private equity, 
venture capital, closely-held operating companies, etc.  Furthermore, 
not only would the fiduciary need to be competent to determine 
whether any such investment was suitable for the account but, where 
the investment was deemed appropriate, she must also be able manage 
the asset once it was in trust.  Few financial managers are sufficiently 
knowledgeable across the financial spectrum to make such decisions 
across such a range of complex investments.  Accordingly, if the 
concept of fiduciary prudence is to be informed by modern portfolio 
theory without equivocation, the law must contemplate delegation of 
fiduciary investment responsibility to specialized managers where at 
least certain assets are concerned. 
 
c.  Portfolio Theory and the perpetual trust.  This new legal order is an 
invitation to trustees to invest assets in ways heretofore unimaginable 
for property placed in trust, especially in the case of a perpetual trust 
holding a great fortune.  Prudent Investor recognized that the mix of 
investments and overall risk profile appropriate to a particular account 
must speak to the size of the account, the terms of the trust instrument, 
and the situations of beneficiaries.  Because size of account and 
investment horizon now matter in determining the magnitude of risk 
appropriate to a trust portfolio, a family that transfers its considerable 
wealth into a perpetual trust can justify types of securities with 
magnitudes of risk (and with potential returns) that could not be 
justified in a smaller trust or in one that would terminate sooner.131   
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Academic commentators are well aware of the perpetual trust but, to 
date, they tend to view it primarily as a vehicle by which a family 
exploits the repeal of the Rule against Perpetuities to place its property 
beyond the reach of the transfer tax regime for untold generations to 
come.  In addition, this literature contains occasional references to the 
utility of the perpetual trust for asset protection purposes.132  These 
observations are correct, so far as they go.  The real significance of the 
perpetual trust cannot be appreciated, however, until we discern how it 
can serve the family as a multi-generational investment vehicle.  Only 
then can we see how the attributes of tax minimization and asset 
protection contribute to the determination of the overall risk profile 
appropriate to the account when portfolio theory governs the 
investment of trust property.   It here that their true value lies. 
 
Arguably then, a trustee of a large perpetual trust can justify within the 
portfolio certain risks that would not be consistent with its fiduciary 
duty in other types of trusts. Obviously, the risk calculus now deemed 
appropriate to property in trust provides an investment advantage to the 
ultra-wealthy (as compared to the merely affluent) who not only have 
great wealth to place in trust but whose fortunes are sufficiently large to 
fund a trust lasting for multiple generations.  To say only this, however, 
would be merely to offer the commonplace observation that the rich are 
afforded opportunities to get richer that others do not have.  The claim 
extends further.  What is noteworthy in the case of the perpetual trust is 
the magnitude of the opportunity.  At this juncture we can begin to 
discern how the tax saved when a large fortune is placed in a perpetual 
trust becomes truly valuable.  As important as the elimination of a tax 
burden might be in an era when trusts were invested to preserve the 
face value of assets, where a perpetual trust is invested subject to 
portfolio theory, the tax saved contributes to the size of the res going 
forward – and supports the continued justification under the law for 
investing at least some portion of the account in aggressive – even 
speculative – securities.  As tax is saved with each generation and 
returns consistent with the risk profile of the account are realized, the 
perpetual trust potentially becomes an investment juggernaut.  Savings 
achieved when creditors’ claims are avoided contribute here as well. 
 
In short, Portfolio Theory when applied to the res of a large perpetual 
trust legitimates – indeed encourages -- an entrepreneurial mindset in a 
fiduciary which would have been unthinkable in earlier eras.  For the 
family establishing a perpetual trust to realize the investment potential 
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that a more sophisticated understanding of risk might offer, however, 
the trustee becomes a crucial figure.  Nevertheless, corporate 
fiduciaries – big banks – remain very conservative when it comes to 
investing assets in trust.  The theory of efficient markets 
notwithstanding, a recent study of the investment practices of big-bank 
fiduciaries indicates that Prudent Investor has had at best a modest 
impact on the way these institutions invest.  It might be expected that, 
in the wake of Prudent Investor, trust portfolios at these institutions 
would at a minimum exhibit a significant percentage shift away from 
assets where face value is more secure but returns are limited (debt) 
toward more volatile assets where return would be greater (common 
stock).  Since the advent of Prudent Investor, however, this shift has 
occurred only to a modest degree.133   
 
But wealthy families seeking to grow their assets in trust are looking 
for more than a shift from debt to equity.  Take, for example, the risk 
inherent in a decision to hold a concentrated position, that is, to 
maintain a trust wholly or partially undiversified.  Whereas the very 
wealthy may welcome an investment methodology that sanctions 
reference to the trust portfolio as a whole, these families often do not 
want to be encumbered by the finer points of diversification.  Indeed, it 
is not uncommon for a significant portion of the portfolios of the very 
wealthy to be in holdings such as a large block of founder’s stock 
(possibly with a low tax-cost basis) or a closely-held operating 
company.134  While there is no doubt that Prudent Investor places a 
premium on diversification, an argument can be made that would allow 
a liberal reading of this requirement, especially where assets are held in 
a large perpetual trust.  First of all, the Uniform Act is a only a default 
regime.135  But further, even the default rule explicitly allows for an 
exception where “the trustee reasonably determines that, because of 
special circumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served 
without diversifying.”136   Within a large perpetual trust, a case can be 
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made that a trustee can justify certain risks that might otherwise not be 
consistent with its fiduciary duty.    
 
Nevertheless, big banks remain reluctant to hold concentrated 
positions, especially in assets that are illiquid, for which there is little to 
no market (like closely-held companies), assets that are common 
among the significant holdings of the wealthy.137  Against a more 
liberal reading of Prudent Investor, these institutions argue that this 
conservative posture is consonant with current law.  First and most 
basically, Prudent Investor is of relatively recent vintage (so the 
argument goes) and thus there is relatively little case law to underscore 
the Uniform Act or to inform its application in myriad particular 
situations.  Indeed, where interpretative authority is not available, some 
commentators are inclined to fall back on case law arising under the 
Prudent Man statute to inform the category of “prudence.”138  Second, 
what case law there is under the new regime still calls into question the 
extent to which a trustee can decide not to diversify, even where the 
concentrated position is authorized under the trust agreement.139  
Finally, the Restatement is more explicitly conservative stating that 
“trust provisions are strictly construed against dispensing with the 
requirement of diversification altogether.”140 Even where the trustee is 
authorized with respect to a concentrated position, such a provision 
does not “relieve the trustee of the fundamental duty to act with 
prudence,”141 nor does authorization to hold a particular investment and 
not diversify a portfolio “constitute an exculpatory clause.”142   
 
Whatever the debate about inferences legitimately drawn from the 
Uniform Act, the very wealthy have in important respects moved on.  
For them, where investing for a large perpetual trust is concerned, 
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genuine diversification involves deeper, more sophisticated issues that 
merely the appropriate allocation between fixed income and equity or a 
decision to hold a concentrated position.   The very wealthy now 
appreciate that in a large portfolio genuine diversification requires 
representation of different investment philosophies and the inclusion of 
investments as wide-ranging as hedge funds, private equity, venture 
capital funds and real estate, interests not traded in the public securities 
markets.  Indeed, to realize the full potential of Portfolio Theory for 
purposes of these families, the trustee needs access to state-of-the-art 
investment opportunities (vehicles not likely to be publicly traded), 
together with the specialized knowledge to assess risk with respect to 
such holdings.  Large institutional trustees now typically offer a 
platform of such investments, but even this menu may not satisfy an 
entrepreneurial family willing to search the world for opportunities.   
 
With the advent of Prudent Investor, these families began to press big 
bank fiduciaries to accept outside managers, encouraging them to 
delegate investment responsibility, especially for purposes of state-of-
the-art assets.143  If Prudent Investor is tolerant of delegation of 
fiduciary investment responsibility and would even appear to 
encourage it in certain situations,144 like so many apparently 
liberalizing aspects of Prudent Investor, delegation remains a 
controversial matter for the big bank trustee.  This is because the initial 
decision to delegate as well as all subsequent decisions with respect to 
the delegation are fiduciary acts, carrying with them fiduciary liability.  
Prudent Investor is clear that the trustee must have good reasons to 
delegate. Once a sufficient rationale for delegation has been developed, 
the fiduciary is responsible for the choice of the agent.  And after the 
agent is selected, the fiduciary must continue to exercise discretion, 
establishing the scope and terms of delegation and conducting period 
reviews.145  The Restatement takes a similar position.146  Regulations 
issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the regulatory 
authority for federally chartered banks, sound a similar theme, 
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expressly providing that a bank that delegates it authority over 
investments is nevertheless deemed to retain “investment discretion.”147 
 
Finally, in those instances where the stars align sufficiently so as to 
justify delegation of fiduciary investment responsibility, the total fees 
to the trust are likely to be as much as twice the fee that fiduciary 
would otherwise charge.  Fees charged by big bank fiduciaries have 
long been a source of irritation to wealthy families so that the prospect 
of paying double makes for a special frustration.  While the family 
might anticipate that the presence of the outside adviser would result in 
a commensurate reduction in the trustee’s fee, the need for on-going 
exercise of fiduciary discretion (along with the attendant liability) 
provides continuing justification for the bank to impose its standard fee 
(or something close to it).  And this is the case, even though an outside 
agent is providing day-to-day management of certain assets.148   
 
If the theory of efficient markets has come to inform the legal standards 
governing the investment of property in trust, what it has put in place is 
as much an art as it is a science.  Gone are the bright line tests that 
separated the investment wheat and chaff into the secure and the 
speculative.  Now, at least at the margins – and large perpetual trusts 
are at the margins – fiduciaries may disagree as to the level of risk 
appropriate to an account.  And it is for this reason that many families 
establishing large perpetual trusts want to place a privately owned, 
family trust company at the helm.  The complete realization of the 
potential of Portfolio Theory when applied to a trust res ultimately 
depends on the trustee’s calculus of risk, both in light of an 
interpretation of the trust instrument and the beneficiaries’ situations.  
For the family establishing a perpetual trust to realize the investment 
potential that a more sophisticated understanding of risk might offer, 
the trustee is all important.   
 
Part IV:  Financial Reproduction and the Family Trust Company 
 
While establishing a family trust company might appear to be the final 
frontier in securing a fortune long into the future, more is required.  If 
wealthy families are going to take unto themselves the role of fiduciary, 
in order to bring a sophisticated understanding of risk to bear on trusts 
designed as multi-generational investment vehicles, family members 
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must be prepared to oversee the day-to-day management of an on-going 
enterprise, not the least of which includes making state-of-the-art 
investment decisions.  In creating a family trust company and making it 
trustee of family trusts, financial entropy will not be averted and indeed 
much of the family’s financial security is sure to be jeopardized, unless 
at least some family members are ready, willing and able to undertake 
the considerable responsibility of managing the trust company.  
Further, given that the investment horizon here is multi-generational, 
this need for financial acumen and indeed personal discipline is also 
multi-generational.  To ensure that every generation has at least some 
family members prepared to bring facilitating attitudes about money, 
investing and risk to bear on the family fortune requires attention 
within the family to the cultivation of such attitudes from generation to 
generation.149  Absent sustained talent and discipline, the slow, steady, 
downward trajectory of the trust portfolios of an earlier era will soon in 
retrospect bespeak a golden era in the financial life of the family.   
 
In the face of this need to attend to the inter-generational cultivation of 
attitudes about wealth and investing (in addition managerial expertise), 
there has grown up a considerable industry to guide the very rich in 
what might be termed “financial reproduction” or “financial 
parenting.”150  The literature of this industry puts forward various 
techniques for the transmission of attitudes and perspectives calculated 
to foster prudence and indeed industriousness within the family.  But at 
the end of the day, what this literature counsels is that the family that 
would preserve its fortune must become quite self-consciously 
identified to its wealth.  And further, the family that would manage and 
indeed grow its wealth must effectively commit itself to maintain this 
identity as a wealthy family across generations.  Interestingly, some of 
the literature even goes so far as to draw a parallel between the family 
that would preserve and grow its fortune and a business enterprise.   
 
This literature of “financial parenting” often takes as is point of 
departure a phenomenon termed “affluenza,”– that is, myriad species of 
self-indulgence and accompanying desuetude that supposedly 
characterize the lives of second- and third-generation members of 
wealthy families.151  Investment options notwithstanding, it is this self-
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indulgence and desuetude (so this literature claims) that ensures great 
fortunes are soon lost and lends truth to the proverb “shirtsleeves to 
shirtsleeves in three generations.”152   
 
But for a wealthy family intending to preserve a great fortune (as in the 
instance of a family establishing its own trust company), more is 
necessary than simply stemming the tide of second- and third-
generation social alienation or indeed decadence.  It is not simply a 
matter of inculcating moral and cultural values in children so as to 
create persons who are capable of responsible personal self-
governance.153  What a wealthy family is ultimately about (so this 
literature counsels) is its fortune – not just preserving it, but ideally 
growing it.  To do this, members must appreciate the essential attributes 
and insights of the generation that made the fortune – the enterprising 
generation.  Taken together, these attitudes and insights make for a 
particular ethos about wealth and privilege.  The goal is to have later 
generations embrace this ethos with a certain consciousness, knowing 
that this set of attitudes -- values instrumental in the family’s financial 
success – along with its extraordinary wealth, set the family apart in the 
world.  Financial educators serving the very wealthy suggest that they 
engage their children from an early age in discussions about the 
purpose of family wealth (a process called “wealth education”).154  The 
idea is to apprehend the family’s “differentness” – that is, the origin of 
its privilege as well as the character traits, attitudes and possible 
expertise that have sustained this privilege (all of which some term “the 
family story”).155  Indeed to underscore the importance of this self-
conscious identity, one advisor has even likened the multi-generational 
wealthy family to a “tribe.”  “Becoming a tribe requires a family to 
adopt a form of decision-making that seeks consensus about what 
actions will likely perpetuate the tribe’s success and thus its 
survival….156 
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Given that these families are seeking to maintain their wealth far into 
the future,157 however, this education ultimately requires an 
institutional framework – a governance structure that will bring 
discipline to the development of this ethos and then allow for 
constructive reconsideration of it by subsequent generations.158  What 
is needed is “a long series of linked transitions” and a system of family 
governance that will “guide[] the joint decisions family members must 
make to successfully complete those transitions.”159   
 
It is in this way that the Family Mission Statement found its way into 
the literature guiding the very wealthy in their efforts at financial 
reproduction.  Adopted from the corporate world where such 
statements serve to bring specificity and focus to the interactions and 
endeavors of diverse protagonists,160 Family Mission Statements were 
first put forward for families of average means.  The idea was to 
catalyze within the family a discussion of its basic values and then 
“codify” them into a constitution of sorts.  This document is to unify 
families around fundamental principles that “get built right into the 
very structure and culture of the family.”161  Like any constitution, the 
Family Mission Statement serves as a point of reference as the family 
moves forward.  It can also be revisited and amended in light of 
fundamental changes in the family or the larger world. 
 
Still embraced by many people of modest means as a tool of the 
broader endeavor of “social reproduction,”162 the Family Mission 
Statement has nevertheless acquired a certain edge as wealth educators 
now proffer it to the very wealthy in pursuit of the narrower goal of 
“financial reproduction.”  Most basically, these families are advised 
that the process of developing such a statement provides a context in 
which a wealthy family can confront the origin and meaning of 
privilege in its own instance and, further, reinvent itself as a wealthy 
family from generation to generation.163  Interestingly, however, 
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especially where the very rich are concerned, some of this literature 
draws parallels between the wealthy family seeking continued financial 
prosperity and the well-managed business enterprise.  The claim is that 
the business enterprise provides an apt analogy because, like a 
business, the object of the family is “to organize our financial, 
intellectual, and human assets for the purpose of the preserving and 
enhancing each of these in succeeding generations.”164  One wealth 
adviser elaborates:  “[T]he most important role in the management of 
an enterprise is arranging for orderly succession.”165  And further on:  
“Families attempting long-term wealth preservation often don’t 
understand that they are businesses and that the techniques of long-term 
succession planning practiced by all other businesses are available to 
them as well.”166  
 
The wealthy family as business ceases to be a metaphor, however, and 
becomes a reality when this literature turns to consider the uses of the 
family trust company.   While perhaps not appreciating the magnitude 
of the investment opportunity presented by these entities (especially 
under Prudent Investor), this literature still recognizes that the family 
trust company can serve the family in the mechanics of investing – for 
example, as a consolidation vehicle, allowing all family holdings to be 
managed in one place and subjected to a coordinated, long-term 
investment strategy.167  More interestingly, however, is the insight in 
this literature that the family trust company can serve as the primary 
institutional context for the essential tasks of “financial reproduction” 
in all its dimensions and across multiple generations.  For a very 
wealthy family, myriad aspects of family life can be coordinated 
through the trust company.  The trust company is a “family seat,” a 
“repository of the family history” with a “perpetual life,” a locus for 
governance of many types to take place, a meeting place where the 
wealthy family interacts and perpetuates its identify as a wealthy 
family.168  Most importantly for a family identified to its wealth, the 
family trust company provides a context in which successive 
generations can be tutored in long-term wealth preservation consistent 
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with the family’s particular ethos about money and investing (perhaps 
articulated in a family mission statement).  The family trust company 
presents a golden opportunity to put into play the attitudes and skills 
deemed instrumental to the family’s historic financial success.  As 
successive generations of a family manage their investment risk to 
secure their fortune long into the future, successive generations are also 
given opportunity to rediscover and indeed reaffirm their 
“differentness” – their privilege.169 
 
The suggestion that the family trust company can serve as a context 
within which a wealthy family can develop an ethos about money and 
investing (and ultimately an identity as a wealthy family) acquires great 
resonance when considered alongside the opportunities under the 
Prudent Investor statute to invest property in trust, especially where the 
portfolio is large enough and the time horizon extended.  To realize the 
full potential of Prudent Investor as applicable to a large perpetual trust, 
a trustee needs a sophisticated understanding of risk and skills 
sufficient to choose investments consistent with the risk profile.  If a 
family is going to take over this role through a family trust company, 
these aptitudes must somehow be present in every generation going 
forward.  What the literature of financial reproduction makes clear, 
however, is that the development of these aptitudes in one generation 
and the transmission of them to another is (of necessity) about so much 
more than investing.  As older and younger generations of a family 
come together to play various roles in the management of the family 
fortune – and to exploit the opportunities available under Prudent 
Investor where a fortune is in trust – what is also happening is the 
transmission of an identity as a very wealthy and indeed privileged 
family. 
 
Conclusion 
  
The tendency of all lawyers (including legal scholars) is to examine 
laws seriatim, one by one, and not pursue the combined effects of rules 
drawn from diverse areas of the law – neither discerning the 
extraordinary burdens of such combined effects nor the opportunities 
created by the layering the benefits of various laws not necessarily 
intended to be used in concert.  The real significance of new laws 
affording the very wealthy ready access to the family trust company 
cannot be apprehended if the particulars of these rules are examined in 
isolation.  The opportunity that they afford the extraordinarily rich can 
only be seen when we attend to the way these wealthy families intend 
to use the family trust company to exploit other laws applicable to the 
transfer and administration of funds held in trust.  The family trust 
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company beautifully positions a wealthy family to exploit the 
elimination of the Rule against Perpetuities in certain states to create 
perpetual trusts, to “leverage” exemptions from or credits against 
federal transfer tax applicable to the transfers into such trusts, and, most 
importantly, to make the most of new laws under which the 
determination of risk for such trusts has become as much an art as a 
science.  In addition, the sustained process of gathering together within 
the family trust company for the purpose of preserving and growing the 
family fortune creates for the wealthy a venue for “financial 
reproduction.”  The family trust company invites the older generation 
to tutor the younger in long-term wealth preservation consistent with 
the family’s particular ethos about money and investing.  As each 
generation embraces and employs this ethos to preserve the family 
fortune, each generation becomes quite self-consciously identified to its 
wealth, cognizant of its privilege.   
 
Finally, we must not overlook the normative dimension of these 
entities.  If intransient, radical differences in means are problematic in a 
democracy so that the dissipation of great fortunes has generally been 
viewed as salubrious, the advent of the family trust company acquires 
an additional significance for the larger democratic polity.  The 
potential of these entities to forestall the dissipation of great fortunes 
and the opportunity they provide to the very wealthy to embrace a self-
conscious identity as a wealthy family are almost certain to set these 
families apart in an experience of living quite different from other 
citizens – precisely what many theorists of democracy would seek to 
avoid.170   
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